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Righting the Historical Record:
A Case for Appellate Jurisdiction over Appeals
of Sentences for Reasonableness Under
28 U.S.C. § 1291
Briana Lynn Rosenbaum*
This Article is the first to analyze critically the jurisdictional basis for the Supreme
Court’s mandate in United States v. Booker that all courts of appeals review the length
of criminal sentences for “reasonableness.” The availability of appellate review has
expanded greatly since the Booker opinion, and, indeed, recent research shows that the
number of sentence appeals has risen. Unfortunately, the Court did not explain the
jurisdictional basis for its expanded “reasonableness review.” The omission is not
trivial. For decades, federal courts have held that courts of appeals do not have
jurisdiction to review the length of criminal sentences. This view has been especially
entrenched since 1984, when Congress created the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and a
corresponding “limited” right to appeal sentences. The Supreme Court may not
increase the jurisdiction of these courts; the Constitution gives this power to Congress
alone. This Article revives the scholarship on the historical and legislative
underpinnings of appellate review of criminal sentences in an attempt to find a
justification, if any, for Booker’s expanded appellate review. The Author concludes, as
have other scholars, that the courts of appeals have had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 to review the length of sentences since at least 1891, and additionally argues that
this jurisdiction survived the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Supreme Court in
Booker created an entirely new type of sentencing decision, a purely discretionary
decision, that lies outside the federal Guidelines system and, thus, outside that system’s
limited appellate review. Accordingly, at least for these types of purely discretionary
sentencing decisions, § 1291 remains the basis for jurisdiction over Booker
reasonableness appeals.

* Law Fellow and Instructor, Stanford Law School. I would like to express my deep gratitude to
Norman Spaulding, Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, whose advice (both professional and
scholarly) greatly affected the tenor of this piece. Many thanks also to George Fisher, Professor of
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Hastings College of the Law, for donating their time and energy to helping better this piece, and to
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Introduction
From the creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1984
(“Guidelines”) until January 2005 when the Supreme Court issued its
1
opinion in United States v. Booker, courts unanimously agreed that
courts of appeals in the federal system had only a limited power to hear
2
appeals of criminal sentences. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and (b)—the
appellate provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) that
3
created the Guidelines —defendants and the government could file

1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. See, e.g., United States v. McAndrews, 12 F.3d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 1993) (“In the post-guidelines
era, then, only sentences that meet the criteria [listed] in section 3742 are amenable to appellate
review.”); see also authorities cited infra note 235.
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), (b) (2006); see also Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98473, tit. II, ch. II, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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appeals challenging only four categories of sentences: (1) sentences
“imposed in violation of law,” (2) sentences “imposed as a result of an
incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines,” (3) sentences that are
outside the applicable guidelines range, and (4) sentences that are
“imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline and
4
[are] plainly unreasonable.” Before Booker, the Supreme Court and
most courts of appeals agreed that Congress’s decision to provide
appellate review of these four specific categories of sentences meant that
5
Congress intended to foreclose review of all other types of sentences.
Following this logic, courts of appeals routinely rejected for lack of
jurisdiction appeals of sentences that fell within the applicable guidelines
6
range.
Despite this seemingly well-entrenched limit on appellate
jurisdiction over sentencing decisions, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Booker directed appellate courts to take jurisdiction over
7
appeals of the substantive reasonableness of all sentences. This directive
to review the length of all sentences for reasonableness unquestionably
results in a substantial expansion of appellate jurisdiction. After Booker,
defendants (and presumably the government as well) are now able to
appeal an entire subset of sentences that were previously unassailable:
within-guidelines sentences where the appellant challenges only the
8
length of the sentence and does not claim some specific legal error.

The SRA
creat[ed] a sentencing commission to develop binding rules—inaptly named guidelines—
that limited available sentences in particular cases. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
assigned narrow sentencing ranges within the broader statutory sentencing limits. These
Guideline ranges were based on a number of variables, including the circumstances
surrounding the offense and the defendant’s prior criminal convictions.
Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 Ala. L.
Rev. 1, 5 (2008). Once the sentencing judge found (either through her own fact finding or based on the
jury’s verdict) the specific combination of variables that triggered a specific guidelines range, the judge
(with limited exceptions) was bound to sentence within that range. Id.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), (b).
5. The Supreme Court affirmed this theory in United States v. Ruiz, when it held that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a) did not “authorize” an appeal of an otherwise lawful within-guidelines sentence “where the
ground for appeal consists of a claim that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to depart.”
536 U.S. 622, 627 (2002) (listing cases). But see United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1321–22 (10th
Cir. 2004) (holding that § 1291 continues to provide subject matter jurisdiction over sentencing appeals
despite waiver of the right to appeal).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing cases).
7. 543 U.S. 220, 260 (2005) (“[T]he [Sentencing Reform] Act continues to provide for appeals
from sentencing decisions (irrespective of whether the trial judge sentences within or outside the
Guidelines range in the exercise of his discretionary power under § 3553(a)).”); see also id. at 311
(Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (“[T]he Court would now have [the reasonableness standard] apply
across the board to all sentencing appeals, even to sentences within ‘the applicable guideline range,’
where there is no legal error or misapplication of the Guidelines.” (quoting § 3742(f)(2)(A), (B)).
8. Compare United States v. Pelayo-Bautista, 907 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Appellate
review of a sentence that is within the correctly applied guideline range and was not imposed in
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It now also appears that this reasonableness review has caused a
substantial increase in the actual caseload of the courts of appeals. A
survey of cases conducted by the New York Council of Defense Lawyers
suggests that the overwhelming majority (76%) of sentences appealed to
the federal courts of appeals on “reasonableness” in the year following
9
Booker were within-guidelines sentences. Moreover, data from the U.S.
Sentencing Commission show that the actual number of sentence appeals
10
has risen significantly since Booker. The Commission reported that,
from 2000 to 2004, federal courts of appeals heard, per year, an average
of 2966 appeals challenging the sentence only (as opposed to the
conviction), whereas from 2005 to 2009, the courts heard a yearly average
11
of 4895 sentence-only appeals—an increase of 65%. Appeals of both
the sentence and the conviction have risen as well, from an average of
1327 a year to 1899 a year, while appeals of the conviction only have
12
remained at just around 2000 per year since 2000. This increase in
sentence appeals since Booker cannot simply be attributed to a rise in
13
criminal cases in the federal system. Indeed, the percentage of total
sentences appealed has also increased. For example, in the year before
14
Booker, defendants appealed their sentences in 6.6% of cases, while in
15
the year after, they appealed them 11.4% of the time. After 2006, the
16
percentage of sentences appealed decreased to around 8–9%. This is
perhaps because federal defendants caught on quickly that courts of

violation of law is not expressly authorized by section 3742(a). Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction
over this appeal.”), with United States v. Plouffe, 445 F.3d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006) (overruling
Pelayo-Bautista as “clearly irreconcilable” with the Booker mandate to “review the reasonableness of
all sentences”).
9. See Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 2a–3a, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (No. 06-5754) (asserting that of the 1515
sentences that parties appealed for “unreasonableness” in 2006, 1152 were appeals of withinguidelines sentences).
10. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Sourcebooks of Federal Sentencing Statistics intro. & tbl.55
(2001–2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/index.cfm.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Office of Judges Programs, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal
Judicial Caseload Statistics 7 (2006) (reporting a “new record” in the number courts of appeals
filings in 2006, which the office attributed largely to criminal appeals filed as a result of Booker and
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)).
14. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Sourcebooks of Federal Sentencing Statistics intro. & tbl.55
(2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2004/
SBTOC04.htm. The Author calculated these percentages using information provided in the studies
regarding how many cases were tracked in any given year and the number of each type of appeal
reported in table 55 of each study. See id.
15. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Sourcebooks of Federal Sentencing Statistics intro. & tbl.55
(2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2006/
SBTOC06.htm.
16. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Sourcebooks of Federal Sentencing Statistics intro. & tbl.55
(2007–2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/index.cfm.
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appeals rarely reversed sentences on reasonableness grounds.
Nevertheless, according to the U.S. Sentencing Commission data, the
number of sentence appeals is still above pre-Booker levels by at least 2–
18
3%. A thorough analysis of the possible explanations for these numbers
is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is reasonable to assume that the
newfound ability after Booker to appeal within-guidelines sentences for
reasonableness has affected appeal rates.
Despite the clear magnitude of the expansion of appellate review
the Court caused in Booker, there has been no scholarship analyzing the
appropriateness of that decision. This is not to say that the Booker
decision has gone unnoticed. The Court in Booker upended the federal
guidelines system, provoking massive debates over how to implement
that opinion without undermining the Guidelines’ purpose. Scholars
have particularly focused on the constitutional implications of the
Court’s Sixth Amendment holding and problems with the actual
implementation of the advisory Guidelines scheme the Court mandated
19
in that case. But this preoccupation has left unnoticed a very serious
question regarding the propriety, whether legal or practical, of expanding
the jurisdictional scope of the courts of appeals.
How did Booker, a Sixth Amendment case about the right to a jury
trial of the facts that increase sentences, result in such a massive
expansion of appellate jurisdiction? As the Third Circuit has recognized,
“The Supreme Court did not explain the jurisdictional basis for the
20
reasonableness review it mandated in Booker.” The omission is not
trivial. While the Supreme Court may set a standard of review (namely,
17. See Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 5–6, 1a, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (No. 06-5754) (reporting that of the
1152 within-guidelines sentences appealed by defendants in an almost eleven-month period in 2006,
only one sentence was reversed for being substantively unreasonable).
18. Compare U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Sourcebooks of Federal Sentencing Statistics intro. &
tbl.55 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/
2004/SBTOC04.htm, with U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Sourcebooks of Federal Sentencing Statistics
intro. & tbl.55 (2007–2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/index.cfm. Similarly,
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reported that the number of criminal appeals in 2008 was
4% higher than in 2004, although the report also noted a steady decline in Booker-related appeals
from 2006 to 2008. Office of Judges Programs, Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 7 (2008).
19. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker:
Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 195 (2005) (arguing Booker
represents a possible retreat from the blunder that the Apprendi line of cases made of the relationship
between the Constitution and substantive criminal law); Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches
About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 137 (2006) (criticizing the post-Booker
trend to treat the Guidelines as mandatory despite the Booker holding); Graham C. Mullen & J.P.
Davis, Mandatory Guidelines: The Oxymoronic State of Sentencing After United States v. Booker, 41
U. Rich. L. Rev. 625 (2007) (reviewing federal sentencing jurisprudence and arguing that the postBooker sentencing regime, especially in the Fourth Circuit, is unconstitutional as an essentially
mandatory guidelines scheme).
20. United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 2006).
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reasonableness) for the courts of appeals, it may not increase the
21
jurisdiction of these courts. Indeed, “[n]o court, including the United
States Supreme Court, has the power to promulgate a declaration of
jurisdiction. That remains the exclusive province of Congress within the
22
boundaries set forth by the Constitution.” And because there is no
constitutional right to appeal a criminal sentence, the jurisdiction of the
courts of appeals is “limited to those subjects encompassed within a
23
statutory grant of jurisdiction.”
Hence, if the courts of appeals did not have jurisdiction to review
within-guidelines sentences before Booker, how can they miraculously
24
have that jurisdiction after Booker? After Booker, prosecutors across
25
the country argued that they did not. These arguments always lost;
indeed, only one federal judge, Judge Ruggero Aldisert, in his dissent in
the Third Circuit case United States v. Cooper, agreed that courts of
appeals do not have jurisdiction to hear appeals of within-guidelines
26
sentences for reasonableness. This open jurisdictional question casts
doubt on the viability of the ever-increasing number of criminal sentence
appeals since Booker. Furthermore, without a clear answer to this
question, one is left with the impression that the Supreme Court took
upon itself the power to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a
27
power the Constitution clearly gives to Congress alone. Most of the
21. See id. at 339 (Aldisert, J., concurring and dissenting).
22. Id. (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
23. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982); see also
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (“A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in
a criminal case, however grave the offence of which the accused is convicted, was not at common law
and is not now a necessary element of due process of law. It is wholly within the discretion of the State
to allow or not to allow such a review.”); United States v. Arishi, 54 F.3d 596, 596–97 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“The right to appeal is statutory, not constitutional. A party ‘must come within the terms of [an]
applicable statute’ in order to appeal.” (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977))).
24. Despite earlier opinions forbidding review of within-guidelines sentences, all courts of appeals
now review within-guidelines sentences for reasonableness after Booker. Initially, most did not discuss
the statutory basis for doing so. See, e.g., United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 517 (1st Cir.
2006); United States v. Marcussen, 403 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2005) (conducting a reasonableness
review of sentences within the guidelines range without reaching the question of jurisdiction); United
States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2005) (same). The First Circuit has simply explained, “A
majority of Justices said explicitly in Booker that sentences would be reviewable for reasonableness
whether they fell within or without the guidelines, and for us that is the end of the matter.” JiménezBeltre, 440 F.3d at 517 (footnote omitted). Under the longstanding rule that the Supreme Court cannot
create jurisdiction, this position is untenable.
25. See, e.g., Cooper, 437 F.3d at 328 n.5 (majority opinion).
26. Id. at 333–34 (Aldisert, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at
523–24 (Howard, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Although I think the
government has the better of the jurisdictional argument, and although I would hold that there still is
no right to appeal discretionary decisions to sentence within the properly calculated guidelines
sentencing range, the issue is better left to the Supreme Court.” (citing Cooper, 437 F.3d at 333–40
(Aldisert, J., concurring and dissenting))).
27. There is a longstanding debate among federal courts scholars about whether Congress’s
power to make exceptions to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and to establish and control the

Rosenbaum-62-HLJ-865 (Do Not Delete)

March 2011]

RIGHTING THE HISTORICAL RECORD

4/28/2011 12:26 PM

871

legal world appears to be totally unfazed by the Court’s apparent powergrabbing. But the issue is one of extreme importance. Jurisdictional
limitations are a key ingredient in the American system of separation
and equalization of powers and, thus, “go[] to the very foundation of our
28
constitutional scheme.”
In this Article, I offer an analysis of appellate jurisdiction over
sentencing decisions that serves to legitimize the current practice of
reviewing criminal sentences for reasonableness. After briefly discussing
the Booker decision in Part I, I trace in Part II the development of the
right to appeal sentencing decisions from the beginning of our nation to
today. After demonstrating the statutory availability of appellate review
of sentences, I then revive the scholarship on the historical scope of that
review, discussing both the limitations of the types of appeals historically
allowed in the courts and the articulated reasons for those limitations.
Through this analysis, I confirm that, contrary to popular opinion, the
courts of appeals definitively had jurisdiction to review criminal
sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the “final decision” statute, at least
until Congress enacted the SRA in 1984. Although courts routinely
rejected appeals of the length of sentences for lack of jurisdiction before
the SRA, they did so erroneously, relying on older case law without fully
analyzing the basis for those decisions. In fact, this “rule of nonreview”
was based not on jurisdiction, but on a policy of deference to the
sentencing judge—a policy that can be changed at any point, by either
Congress or the Supreme Court. Despite this, federal courts have long
cited decades-old cases for the proposition that courts of appeals do not
29
have jurisdiction to hear appeals of sentences within statutory limits.
This is simply wrong. The jurisdictional basis of the rule of nonreview is
firmly entrenched in sentencing jurisprudence due to a combination of
judicial inertia and stare decisis. One must go back decades to discover
its original articulation.

jurisdiction of lower federal courts means that it has plenary control over everything but the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction, or something more limited. I do not, through this Article, intend to imply
a position in that debate. The purpose of this Article is to assume, as federal courts routinely do, see
authorities cited supra notes 21–23, that Congress alone has the power to expand and limit the
jurisdiction of the Article III courts and, considering that assumption, to determine whether the
Supreme Court has usurped some of that power in Booker.
28. United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1333 (10th Cir. 2004) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citing
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998)).
29. See Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Direct Review by United States Court of Appeals of
Duration of Sentence Imposed by District Court in Federal Criminal Prosecution, Where Duration Does
Not Exceed Statutorily Authorized Maximum, 21 A.L.R. Fed. 655, § 3[a] (1974) (citing cases
supporting “the general rule” that courts of appeals ordinarily cannot directly review the length of
sentences imposed in federal criminal cases “where the duration of the sentences does not exceed the
statutorily authorized maximum”); see also United States v Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604 (2d Cir.
1952) (holding that, unless the court were to “over-rule sixty years of undeviating federal precedents,
[it] must hold that an appellate court has no power to modify a sentence” on appeal).
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Having established an independent basis of jurisdiction in § 1291, I
then present, in Part III, the first scholarly analysis of whether 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a) and (b) limit that jurisdiction so as to preclude review of
sentences for reasonableness. First, I review and reject the majority
position that jurisdiction over review for reasonableness can be found in
§ 3742(a)(1) and (b)(1), which authorize appeals of sentences “imposed
30
in violation of law.” I go on to suggest two alternative bases for finding
appellate jurisdiction over “reasonableness review” of within-guidelines
sentences: jurisdiction under § 3742(a)(4) and (b)(4), the “catchall”
provisions of the SRA, and jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the “final
31
decision statute.”
Through an analysis of the SRA, the legislative history surrounding
the SRA, and the pre-SRA review landscape, I ultimately argue that
18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 work in tandem, limiting judicial
review of only those sentencing decisions that are part of Congress’s
Sentencing Guidelines scheme, but leaving intact the general grant of
jurisdiction over sentence appeals under § 1291. Accordingly, § 1291
remains the justification for appeals of the ultimate discretionary
sentencing decisions that the Supreme Court created in Booker.

I. The BOOKER Decision
Before delving into the historical appellate jurisdiction of the courts
of appeals, it will help to first have a basic understanding of the Booker
decision. In United States v. Booker, a five-member majority of the Court
held that the Guidelines were unconstitutional under the Sixth
Amendment because under those Guidelines, the judge—not the jury—
found facts that determined the appropriate guidelines range and thus
32
“determined the upper limits of sentencing.” This type of judicial factfinding ran afoul of the Court’s previous holdings in Blakely v.
Washington and Apprendi v. New Jersey that “[a]ny fact (other than a
prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury
verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a
33
reasonable doubt.”
Although few in the legal world were surprised by the Court’s
decision to reaffirm Apprendi and Blakely in the context of the
Guidelines, many were surprised by the Court’s take on the appropriate
remedy for the constitutional violation. In what is often called Booker’s
“remedial opinion,” a different majority of five Justices decided that the
30. See infra Part III.A.1.
31. See infra Part III.B.
32. 543 U.S. 220, 236, 243–44 (2005).
33. Id. at 244 (discussing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
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best way to cure the Sixth Amendment flaw in the Guidelines was to
34
make them advisory. The theory goes that, if sentencing judges are not
required to impose a sentence within a certain guidelines range after
finding specific facts, then there is no statutory maximum driven by the
Guidelines, the Blakely and Apprendi rules do not apply, and thus the
jury need not find the facts supporting the sentence beyond a reasonable
doubt. According to the remedial majority, so long as federal sentencing
judges only “consult [the] Guidelines and take them into account when
35
sentencing,” the constitutional error is cured.
In order to free sentencing judges from the “mandatory” nature of
the Guidelines, the Supreme Court also had to revamp appellate court
review of sentencing decisions. To do that, a bit of statutory
housecleaning was required. As the remedial majority explained, one
provision of the SRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), was incompatible with the
36
advisory Guidelines scheme the Court created. Section 3742(e) set forth
various standards of review on appeal of specific sentencing decisions,
including de novo review of departures from the applicable guidelines
37
range. Under § 3742(e), a court of appeals reviewing a sentence outside
the range had to determine whether the sentencing judge correctly
38
followed both the Guidelines and their corresponding policy provisions.
But because sentencing judges could no longer be forced to follow the
Guidelines, such rigid review would no longer be appropriate. Therefore,
39
the Supreme Court struck down § 3742(e).
The Court did not eliminate appeals of criminal sentences
altogether. The Court explicitly left intact 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and (b),
which set forth the specific types of sentences from which a defendant
40
and the government can appeal. Under § 3742(a) and (b), federal
appellate courts can still hear (as they had before Booker) the four
41
enumerated types of sentencing appeals. But, since the Supreme Court
struck down the standards of review for these appeals located in

34. Id. at 258–65. To make the Guidelines “advisory,” the Court “severed and excised” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(1), the provision of the federal sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory. Id.
at 245.
35. Id. at 264. As one article has explained, “In other words, Booker and Blakely do not hold that
the Constitution forbids a judge from increasing a maximum available sentence; rather, their holding is
that judicial factfinding cannot be the only way to increase the maximum available sentence.” Hessick
& Hessick, supra note 3, at 7 n.23.
36. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000).
38. See id. (requiring, among other things, reversal of a sentence that departs from the applicable
guideline range based on a factor that “is not authorized under section 3553(b)”).
39. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
40. See id. at 260.
41. See id. at 224 (“[D]espite § 3553(b)(1)’s absence, the Act continues to provide for appeals
from sentencing decisions (irrespective of whether the trial judge sentences within or outside the
Guidelines range).” (citing § 3742(a) and (b))).
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§ 3742(e), courts of appeals had no direction as to how they should
review sentences on appeal. What to do? Not to worry, the Court
declared. Federal courts had been reviewing sentences outside the
applicable guidelines ranges for “reasonableness” for many years and are
perfectly capable of applying that same standard to all sentences in the
42
context of the newly advisory guidelines. Accordingly, the Court held,
the courts of appeals must from then on apply a “reasonableness”
standard of review to sentencing decisions “irrespective of whether the
43
trial judge sentences within or outside the Guidelines range.” This
reasonableness review, the Court explained, would “continue to move
sentencing in Congress’s preferred direction, helping to avoid excessive
sentencing disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient to
44
individualize sentences where necessary.”
The Court has had several opportunities since Booker to clarify its
45
remedial holding. Two of these cases, Rita v. United States and Gall v.
46
United States, are particularly pertinent here. In Rita, the Court held
that a court of appeals may treat sentences within the properly calculated
47
guidelines range as presumptively reasonable. However, the Court also
48
cautioned that “the presumption applies only on appellate review.” As
the Court explained in Gall, the Guidelines are merely “the starting
point and the initial benchmark” of the sentencing decision at the district
49
court level. The district judge must also consider “all of the § 3553(a)
factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a
party” and only then, after making “an individualized assessment based
on the facts presented,” can the judge decide whether an outside50
guidelines or inside-guidelines sentence is warranted. Finally, the Court

42. Id. at 260–63. Until 2003, § 3742(e) directed appellate courts to review sentences that fell
“outside the applicable guideline range” for reasonableness. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (1994); see also
Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
43. Booker, 543 U.S. at 260 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)–(b)). After excising § 3742(e), the
standard of review section of the SRA, the Court reviewed both the remaining portions of the SRA
and “appellate sentencing practice during the last two decades,” and held that review for
“unreasonableness” was implicitly set forth in the SRA. Id. at 261–62. Justice Scalia, in his dissent,
strongly disagreed, calling the Court’s remedy a “redrafting” of the statute. Id. at 310 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part). “Only in Wonderland,” Justice Scalia notes, can the Court “use[] the power of
implication to fill a gap created by the Court’s own removal of an explicit standard.” Id. at 309–10.
Regardless of the allure of Justice Scalia’s argument, the majority prevailed, and reasonableness
review remains.
44. Id. at 264–65 (majority opinion).
45. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
46. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
47. Rita, 551 U.S. at 347.
48. Id. at 351.
49. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49.
50. Id. at 49–50. Section 3553(a) lists seven factors that a court must consider in imposing a
sentence, including, for example, “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant” and “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.”
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further clarified that “reasonableness review” equated to “a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard,” and that “courts of appeals must review
all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the
51
Guidelines range” under this standard.
Although the Court in Gall specifically affirmed the requirement
that the courts of appeals review all federal sentences for reasonableness,
the Court has yet to explain the jurisdictional basis for the courts of
appeals to do so. This is a significant omission, especially considering the
expanded role of the courts of appeals after Booker.
Two statutes currently provide possible bases for jurisdiction to
review within-guidelines sentences for reasonableness after Booker:
(1) 18 U.S.C. § 3742, the jurisdictional statute enacted in 1984 as part of
the SRA; and, (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the more general, “final decision”
statute. The next two Parts explore the history and scope of both statutes
in order to discern their impact on appellate jurisdiction over sentencing
decisions today.

II. Pre-SRA Review of Sentences in the Federal Courts:
The Origin of the Rule of Nonreview
28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides: “The courts of appeals . . . shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the
52
United States.” As the historical analysis below shows, this “final
53
decision” statute has existed in various forms since about 1891. A “final
decision” is a decision by a district court that “ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
54
judgment.” There is no question that sentences are “final decisions”
within the meaning of § 1291: According to the Supreme Court, “Final
judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the
55
judgment.” Prior to the SRA, courts of appeals routinely heard

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). Section 3553(a)(4), which the Court left intact in Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264
(2005), requires that the sentencing court consider the sentencing range provided by the Guidelines.
§ 3553(a)(4).
51. Gall, 552 U.S. at 41.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
53. See Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989) (reviewing the evolution
of § 1291); Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 245 n.19 (1981) (same); United States v. Hahn,
359 F.3d 1315, 1322 n.7 (10th Cir. 2004) (same).
54. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
55. Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937). The question presented in Berman was
whether a judgment in a criminal case is final for the purpose of appeal as a temporal matter. See id.
That is, whether the fact that a sentence was suspended made the sentence not “final” according to the
terms of § 1291. See id. It was not a case about the appealability of a sentence. Nevertheless, many
courts have used this language as support for the fact that a sentence is reviewable under § 1291. See,
e.g., Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1320 (“It is beyond dispute that a conviction and imposition of a sentence
constitute a final judgment for § 1291 purposes.”); United States v. McAndrews, 12 F.3d 273, 276–77
(1st Cir. 1993) (citing Berman). Regardless of the logic (or lack thereof) of this tactic, the fact remains
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sentencing appeals under § 1291 where a defendant challenged the
56
sentence alone. Accordingly, at least until Congress passed the SRA in
1984, § 1291 should have provided courts of appeals with subject matter
57
jurisdiction to review criminal sentences.
Despite this, and since about the 1920s, many courts of appeals have
declined to review sentences within the statutory range based on a
longstanding rule that courts of appeals have no jurisdiction to review
58
the duration of sentences. As the Supreme Court has explained in
Dorszynski v. United States: “[i]f there is one rule in the federal criminal
practice which is firmly established, it is that the appellate court has no
59
control over a sentence which is within the limits allowed by statute.”
This rule, often called the “rule of nonreviewability” or “rule of
60
nonreview,” has been subject to overwhelming criticism in the past. The
criticism centers on two main points. First, scholars generally agree that
the early federal courts that created the rule of nonreview, most
61
prominently in the 1917 case Freeman v. United States, misinterpreted
the then-existing statutory language on the appellate powers of the
62
federal courts.
The second criticism of the rule of nonreview has broader
implications for the scope of appellate powers to review sentences for
reasonableness. Under this criticism, to the extent that appellate courts
have declined to review sentences within statutory limits, they have done
so because of a limited standard of review, not based on an inability to
63
accept jurisdiction over those appeals. In fact, courts of appeals have
had jurisdiction to review sentences under § 1291 and its predecessor

that courts have been reviewing sentences under § 1291 for decades. See authorities cited infra note 56.
56. See, e.g., Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1320–21 & nn.3–4 (citing several cases); see also United States v.
Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Prior to the passage of the Sentencing Reform
Act . . . criminal appeals were taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”).
57. It should be mentioned that § 1291 also covers appeals of final decisions in civil cases.
However, only the scope of the statute as it relates to appeals in criminal cases is relevant to this
discussion.
58. See, e.g., Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340–41 (8th Cir. 1930) (declining to review the
severity of a two-year sentence for transportation of a half gallon of whisky due to lack of “control”
over the sentence); Schwartz, supra note 29, § 3[a] (collecting cases supporting the common law rule of
nonreviewability).
59. 418 U.S. 424, 440–41 (1974) (quoting Gurera, 40 F.2d at 340–41).
60. See United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 605 & n.26 (2d Cir. 1952); Robert J. Kutak & J.
Michael Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational Sentence: A Return to the Concept of Appellate Review,
53 Neb. L. Rev. 463, 464–71 (1974); Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing Procedure, 74 Yale L.J. 379,
388–89 (1964) (analyzing the rule of nonreviewability); see also Appellate Review of Sentences: A
Symposium at the Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
32 F.R.D. 249 (1962).
61. 243 F. 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1917).
62. See Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 60, at 465–71.
63. United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006).
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64

statutes since as early as 1891.
While this distinction between standard of review and jurisdiction
may seem pedantic at first glance, it is anything but. If the courts of
appeals do not have jurisdiction to review criminal sentences within
statutory limits, then the Booker Court did not have the power to simply
construct this jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the appellate courts
declined to review sentences within statutory limits for policy reasons,
the Supreme Court did not overstep its boundaries in Booker. The
Supreme Court’s ability to regulate the functions of the district courts
gives it wider latitude to establish, and change, standards of review on
65
appeal.
Several scholars, including most notably Robert Kutak and Michael
Gottschalk, have historically agreed that the rule of nonreviewability is
66
fundamentally flawed. Despite this fact, appellate courts in guidelines
cases cite the rule as preventing appellate review of within-guidelines

64. See infra Part II.A.
65. In Booker, the Court did not rely on its supervisory powers to create the reasonableness
standard of review; instead, the Court claimed it was interpreting the statute authorizing criminal
sentence appeals, the SRA. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260–62 (2005). However, if, as this
Author argues, jurisdiction over sentence appeals of within-guidelines sentences is derived not from
the SRA but from § 1291, then any standard of review implied from the SRA seems irrelevant in that
context. The natural next question is whether the Court could imply a reasonableness review standard
from § 1291, or from § 1291 and § 3742 combined. However, it is not necessary to answer this question
for the purposes of this Article; the Court’s ability to regulate the functions of the appellate courts
provides more than enough authority, even if the statutes do not. As the Supreme Court recently
explained in Dickerson v. United States, “The law in this area is clear. This Court has supervisory
authority over the federal courts, and we may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence and
procedure that are binding in those tribunals.” 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000). Presumably this also includes
the authority to regulate and prescribe standards of review. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,
558 (1988) (recognizing that deferential review of a district court’s decision regarding attorney’s fees
was not “compelled” by the underlying statute, but nevertheless mandating deferential review based,
in part, on polices of “sound judicial administration”).
Although the Court does not appear to question its inherent ability to supervise the
procedures of the inferior courts, see Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437; Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory
Power of the Supreme Court, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 324, 371–84 (2006) (examining Supreme Court cases
relying on supervisory powers to prescribe rules of procedure), scholars continue to debate this
seemingly well-entrenched rule. See Barrett, supra, at 387 (questioning whether the Supreme Court
possesses inherent supervisory authority to impose procedures upon inferior federal courts); Evan H.
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817, 868–37
(1994) (arguing that Article III’s distinction between supreme and inferior courts requires inferior
courts to follow Supreme Court precedents); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme
Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1500–12 (2000) (questioning
Congress’s ability to strip the Supreme Court of its ability to supervise the lower federal courts). The
Supreme Court’s authority to regulate and change the standards of review applied by the courts of
appeals is the subject of my current research.
66. See Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 60, 510–13; see also 3 Charles Alan Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 533, at 336 & n.20 (3d ed. 2004) (providing a brief history of
sentence appeals and citing “extensive literature” written on the subject of the rule of nonreviewability,
“most of it favorable to appellate review of sentencing”).
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67

sentences. This includes Judge Aldisert in his dissent from the Third
68
Circuit decision United States v. Cooper. In Cooper, Judge Aldisert
disagreed with the majority that the Supreme Court in Booker
authorized reasonableness review over within-guideline sentences. Citing
to Dorszynski and other rule-of-nonreviewability cases, Judge Aldisert
argued that jurisdiction over sentence appeals has always been extremely
limited, both before and after the SRA, and does not include a power to
69
review sentences within statutory limits for reasonableness. Since “[n]o
court, including the United States Supreme Court, has the power to
promulgate a declaration of jurisdiction,” Judge Aldisert argued, the
Court in Booker could not have required review of within-guideline
70
sentences for reasonableness.
In order to determine whether the Supreme Court overstepped its
bounds by, in effect, telling the courts of appeals to ignore precedent and
review within-guidelines sentences for reasonableness, it is necessary to
take a fresh look at the history and criticisms of the rule of
nonreviewability.
A. Development of the “Right” to a Criminal Appeal
Considering the modern proliferation of appeals in the criminal
system, it is perhaps surprising to learn that Congress did not grant
criminal defendants the right to appeal in this country until 1889, over a
71
hundred years after the adoption of the United States Constitution.
Indeed, the first Congress, when it established the federal court system
through the First Judiciary Act of 1789, explicitly provided only for
appeals from certain types of judgments in civil actions, suits of equity,
72
and admiralty and maritime cases. Many theories have been advanced
67. See Schwartz, supra note 29, § 3[a] (collecting cases supporting the common law rule of
nonreviewability).
68. Cooper, 437 F.3d at 336–37 (Aldisert, J., concurring and dissenting).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 339 (emphasis in original).
71. Erwin C. Surrency, History of the Federal Courts 215, 219 (1987).
72. Ch. 20, §§ 11, 21–22, 1 Stat. 73, 79, 83–84 (describing the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit
courts); see also id. §§ 13, 22 (describing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court). The First
Judiciary Act of 1789 established separate circuit and district courts. Id. § 4. Although the composition
of the circuit courts would go through many changes, see Surrency, supra note 71, at 27–41, the Act
originally provided that the circuit courts would be composed of one district judge and two Supreme
Court Justices. § 4. To fulfill their “circuit duty,” the Justices of the Supreme Court traveled each year
to “hold circuit” in various locations across the country. Surrency, supra note 71, at 27. Intending that
the circuit courts would preside over the more important civil and criminal trials, see id. at 35,
Congress gave these courts original jurisdiction to try all diversity of citizenship suits involving over
$500 and original jurisdiction over most criminal trials. § 11. Congress reserved for the district courts
jurisdiction over civil cases involving less than $500 and criminal cases “where no other punishment
than whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or a term of
imprisonment not exceeding six months, is to be inflicted.” Id. § 9. Congress also provided that the
circuit courts would play an appellate role, granting them jurisdiction over appeals from “final decrees
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for the lack of criminal appeals in the early years of our nation. Erwin
Surrency proposes one theory in this book, History of the Federal Courts.
He explains that “the issue in the Nineteenth Century was whether the
defendant was guilty of the crime charged rather than the [modern-day]
73
emphasis on observing the proper procedure . . . .” Accordingly, the
practice of appellate review, along with other procedures designed to
ensure fairness in the procedural system (as opposed to its substantive
“correctness”), played only a limited role. Surrency also attributes the
scarcity of criminal appeals to the lack of federal substantive criminal law
in the early years of our nation: “Until the Civil War, the power of
Congress to punish individuals for criminal conduct was limited to crimes
against the laws of the United States and those committed in the areas
74
which were controlled by the federal government.” Thus, there were
very few federal offenses, and states had jurisdiction over most common
75
law and statutory crimes. Because most criminal trials in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries occurred in state court, there were few federal
76
criminal convictions to review.
The Supreme Court affirmed the finality of criminal convictions for
77
purposes of appeal in an 1805 decision, United States v. More. In More,
the defendant sought review in the Supreme Court of his conviction for
78
taking unlawful fees as a Justice of the Peace. On his own initiative,
Chief Justice Marshall “suggested a doubt whether the appellate
79
jurisdiction of [the Supreme Court] extends to criminal cases.” The
defendant argued it did, citing section 2 of Article III of the Constitution,
which provides, “the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
80
Regulations, as the Congress shall make.” The defendant argued that
since Congress did not specifically take criminal appellate jurisdiction

in a district court in causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” where the matter in dispute
exceeded $300 and from “final decrees and judgments in civil actions” where the matter in dispute
exceeded $50. Id. §§ 11, 21, 22. The Supreme Court also served an appellate function over “civil
actions, and suits in equity” from a circuit court, where the matter in dispute exceeded $2000. Id. §§ 13,
22. Over the next century, Congress would eventually merge the trial functions of the circuit and
district courts, making the circuit courts almost exclusively appellate bodies. In 1842, Congress gave
the district courts concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts over all noncapital criminal trials.
Surrency, supra note 71, at 112–13 (citing Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 3, 5 Stat 516, 517). For a
more detailed description of the early American federal court system, see Surrency, supra note 71.
73. Surrency, supra note 71, at 220.
74. Id. at 120.
75. See id. at 113–20; see also Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal
Appeal, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 503, 528 (1992).
76. Arkin, supra note 75, at 528.
77. 7 U.S. (7 Dall.) 159, 173–74 (1805).
78. Id. at 159.
79. More, 7 U.S. at 169.
80. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
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away from the Supreme Court, Congress did not make an “exception” to
81
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction as required by the Constitution. The
More majority disagreed. It noted that section 22 of the First Judiciary
Act explicitly limited the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
82
“civil cases” involving matters in dispute over $2000. This “affirmative
description of [the Court’s] powers,” the Court held, “must be
understood as a regulation, under the constitution, prohibiting the
83
exercise of other powers than those described.” Thus, the judgments of
84
the trial courts in criminal cases were final. Following More, the
Supreme Court routinely rejected requests by defendants to review
criminal judgments—both as to convictions and to sentences—on
85
jurisdictional grounds.
In fact, Congress had established the first mechanism for review in a
criminal case three years earlier, with the Act of April 29, 1802 (“Act of
86
1802”). Section 6 of that Act provided judges of the circuit courts—the
trial courts responsible for the most important civil and criminal trials—
with the power to certify questions to the Supreme Court when the
87
judges of the circuit court could not agree on “any question.” The
impetus for this statute lay in the makeup of the federal courts at the
88
time. The circuit courts consisted of one district judge and two Justices
of the Supreme Court; however, only two judges—including at least one
89
Justice—constituted a quorum. When the two present judges could not
agree on a conviction or sentence, some arbiter was required; section 6
90
placed the Supreme Court in this role. However, while the Act of 1802
made review of circuit decisions possible, the Supreme Court later
81. More, 7 U.S. at 169–70.
82. Id. at 173. For a discussion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the First
Judiciary Act, see supra notes 72 & 78.
83. More, 7 U.S. at 173.
84. Id. at 174 & * (“[I]n criminal cases the judgment of the [district court] is final.” (citing United
States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297, 299 (1796)).
85. See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568, 574 (1833) (“But this court has no appellate
jurisdiction to revise the sentences of inferior courts in criminal cases; and cannot, even if the excess of
the fine were apparent on the record, reverse the sentence.”); see also Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (“[F]or a century after this Court was established, no appeal as of right
existed in criminal cases, and, as a result, appellate review of criminal convictions was rarely
allowed.”); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 319 (1892) (“For a long time after the adoption of
the Constitution, Congress made no provision for bringing any criminal case from a Circuit Court of
the United States to this court by writ of error.”).
86. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156.
87. Id. § 6 (“[W]henever any question shall occur before a circuit court, upon which the opinions
of the judges shall be opposed, the point upon which the disagreement shall happen, shall . . . be stated
under the direction of the judges, and certified under the seal of the court . . . .”).
88. Surrency, supra note 71, at 215–16; see also United States v. Rider, 163 U.S. 132, 135–36
(1896) (reviewing the background of the certificate of division of opinion in section 6 of the Act of
1802).
89. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75.
90. § 6, 2 Stat. at 159–61.
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clarified that defendants “had no right to ask for” certificate to the
91
Supreme Court on a division of opinion. Not surprisingly, this “tiebreaker” statute “was of limited use, and only a few criminal cases came
92
to the court under this procedure.”
The Act of 1802 certification mechanism remained the only review
procedure for criminal law until 1879. Through section 1 of the Act of
March 3, 1879 (“Act of 1879”), Congress gave the circuit courts their first
appellate powers over criminal cases, granting them “jurisdiction of writs
of error in all criminal cases tried before the district court where the
sentence is imprisonment or fine and imprisonment, or where, if a fine
93
only, the fine shall exceed the sum of three hundred dollars.” Although
the Act of 1879 significantly broadened review of criminal cases, it too
had its limits. First, Congress did not grant corresponding appellate
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court. Thus, the decisions of the circuit
94
courts remained final. Second, section 2 of the Act provided that the
circuit judges or justices “may allow such writ of error” after having
95
considered “the importance and difficulty of the questions presented.”
Accordingly, the availability of appeal was discretionary, at the whim of
96
the circuit court.
Despite the limited nature of review offered in the Act of 1879, one
section of the Act is worth further discussion. Section 3 provided, “in
case of an affirmance of the judgment of the district court, the circuit
court shall proceed to pronounce final sentence and to award execution
97
thereon.” Courts seeking to implement the Act began to interpret this
language as providing the circuit courts with the power not only to

91. Ex parte Gordon, 66 U.S. 503, 504–05 (1861) (declining to hear an appeal of a piracy
conviction carrying a death sentence because the circuit judges were not “opposed in opinion”).
92. Surrency, supra note 71, at 216. But see Benjamin Robbins Curtis, Jurisdiction, Practice,
and Peculiar Jurisprudence of the Courts of the United States 83 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1880)
(claiming that the division of opinion procedure was “very often used,” although not specifying
whether specifically used in criminal cases).
93. Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 176, § 1, 20 Stat. 354, 354. The “writ of error,” as described in the Act
of 1879, was the major method of appeal throughout the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth
centuries. See Surrency, supra note 71, at 201. The “writ of appeal” (the method now used exclusively
in the American system) and the writ of error differ in many respects. Id. Most importantly, however,
the writ of error was commonly known “as confining the examination of the reviewing court to the
rulings and hence to the law involved in the case.” Id. at 202. By contrast, on a writ of appeal, “all
evidence before the trial court” was presented to the appellate court, “and the review was much wider
ranging, for . . . the reviewing court reviewed both the facts and the law.” Id. The writ of error was
abolished in all cases in 1928. Id. at 209–10. For more on the subject of the writs of error and appeal,
see id. at 201–09.
94. Arkin, supra note 75, at 523 n.83 (blaming the limited reach of the Act of Mar. 3, 1879 on the
“the shortage of judicial personnel and the fact that there was no appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court” (citing Surrency, supra note 71, at 218)).
95. § 2.
96. Arkin, supra note 75, at 522–23.
97. § 3.
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review the lawfulness of criminal sentences, but also to reduce sentences
they thought excessive without having to remand the case to the district
98
court. As Judge Drummond explained in the 1881 decision United States
v. Bates, “one object of the statute was to give to the circuit court
authority, not only over the rulings of the district court during trial, but
99
also over the degree of punishment imposed upon the party.” Circuit
courts, such as in Bates, thus declared that they would “award execution
in conformity with [their] own opinion as to the degree of punishment
which should be imposed,” if the circuit court disagreed with the district
100
court. According to Judge Drummond, a circuit court need only adopt
the precise terms of conviction and sentence of the district court “where
the judgment of that court is affirmed, not only as to the rulings made
101
during the trial of the cause, but also as to the sentence.” Otherwise,
the statute allowed a circuit court to substitute its judgment for that of
the district court. As an example, the circuit court in United States v.
Wynn relied on its appellate powers under section 3 of the Act of 1879 to
reduce the defendant’s one-year sentence for stealing a letter from the
102
mail, imposed by the district court, to eight months. The court held that
the time already served, eight months imprisonment at hard labor, was a
“sufficient sentence,” considering “all the circumstances, and in view of
the possible doubt of the constitutionality of the question that is
103
involved.” Though courts later questioned whether the power in
section 3 to modify sentences survived subsequent legislation, for the
next twelve years at least, the circuit courts could exercise their appellate
function to determine appropriate criminal sentences.
Congress finally provided criminal defendants with an explicit right
to appeal (as opposed to the former avenues of review that were subject
104
to judicial discretion) in the Act of February 6, 1889 (“Act of 1889”).
Congress initially limited that right to only direct appeals to the Supreme

98. Surrency, supra note 71, at 217 (citing Bates v. United States, 10 F. 92 (Cir. Ct. N.D. Ill.
1881); United States v. Wynn, 11 F. 57 (Cir. Ct. E.D. Mo. 1882)); Arkin, supra note 75, at 523 n.83
(“The circuit courts held themselves empowered to review both the rulings of the district court during
trial and the nature of the penalty imposed.”); see also United States v. Ruiz-Garcia, 886 F.2d 474, 476
n.4 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Prior to 1891, federal appellate courts had, and occasionally exercised, the power
to revise harsh sentences on appeal.” (citing Irving R. Kaufman, Appellate Review of Sentences,
32 F.R.D. 257, 259 & nn.5–6 (1962); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604–07 & nn.24–30 (2d
Cir. 1952)).
99. Bates v. United States, 10 F. 92, 96 (Cir. Ct. N.D. Ill. 1881).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 11 F. 57, 57–58 (Cir. Ct. E.D. Mo. 1882).
103. Id. at 58. Because the defendant in Wynn had already served eight months of his one-year
sentence at the time the court issued its decision, the court’s decision effectively released the
defendant from prison. Id. at 57–58. The court declined to reach the legal issues raised in the appeal,
id. at 57, most likely because they became moot upon the defendant’s release.
104. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655, 656.
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Court from “final judgments” in death penalty cases. However,
Congress expanded the right to appeal to all criminal cases only two
106
years later through the Judiciary Act of 1891. The Judiciary Act of 1891
represented a major overhaul of the entire federal criminal court system.
As part of this Act, Congress formally organized the appellate functions
107
of the circuit courts into the “circuit courts of appeals.” The Circuit
Courts of Appeals functioned much as they do today, exercising only an
appellate function over the trial courts.
Through section 6 of the Judiciary Act of 1891, Congress provided
the Circuit Courts of Appeals with “appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal or by writ of error final decision in the district court and the
existing circuit courts in all cases other than those” over which the
108
Supreme Court had jurisdiction. Accordingly, the new Circuit Courts
of Appeals and the Supreme Court together had appellate jurisdiction
109
over all criminal cases in the federal courts. The Judiciary Act of 1891
was the first federal statute to include the “final decision” language now
located in 28 U.S.C. § 1291; it is widely considered to be the predecessor
110
of the modern statute.

105. Id. (“[I]n all cases of conviction of crime the punishment of which provided by law is death,
tried before any court of the United States, the final judgment of such court against the respondent
shall, upon the application of the respondent, be re-examined, reversed, or affirmed by the Supreme
Court . . . . Every such writ of error shall be allowed as of right . . . .”); see Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 656 n.3 (1977) (“Appeals as of right in criminal cases were first permitted in 1889 when
Congress enacted a statute allowing such appeals ‘in all cases of conviction of crime the punishment of
which provided by law is death.’” (quoting Act of Feb. 6, 1889, § 6)); United States v. Dickinson, 213
U.S. 92, 98 (1909); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 321 (1892) (“The first act of Congress which
authorized a criminal case to be brought from a Circuit Court of the United States to this court, except
upon a certificate of division of opinion, was the act of Feb. 6, 1889 . . . .”).
106. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828. This act is also called the “Circuit Court of
Appeals Act” or the “Evarts Act.”
107. Id. § 2.
108. Id. § 6. In section 5 of the Act, Congress provided that appeals would be taken directly from
the district and circuit courts to the Supreme Court (bypassing the new courts of appeal) “[i]n cases of
conviction of a capital or otherwise infamous crime.” Id. § 5 (emphasis added); see also Ballew v.
United States, 160 U.S. 187, 201 (1895) (citing the Act of Mar. 3, 1891 as conferring appellate
jurisdiction on the circuit courts of appeals in criminal cases not given to the Supreme Court).
Although Congress intended only a limited direct appeal to the Supreme Court, a legislative “goof”
thwarted this intent. As Surrency explains, the Supreme Court had previously defined the term
“infamous crimes” to include any crime that is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison.
Surrency, supra note 71, at 220–21 (citing In re Claasen, 140 U.S. 200 (1891)). Section 5 of the Act
thus effectively gave the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over all criminal cases. Id. at 221; Arkin,
supra note 75, at 523 n.86; see also In re Claasen, 140 U.S. 200, 204–05 (1891) (applying the Supreme
Court’s earlier holding in Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 418 (1885)—where the Court held that “a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of years at hard labor is an infamous crime, within the
provision of the Fifth Amendment”—to the definition of “infamous crime” in section 5 of the
Judiciary Act of 1891).
109. Act of Mar. 3, 1891 §§ 5–6; see also Ballew, 160 U.S. at 201.
110. See Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 245 n.19 (1981) (“Through a succession of recodifications and technical amendments, § 6 of the 1891 Act has been carried forward as 28 U.S.C.
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Over the next twenty years, Congress gradually transferred direct
review of all criminal cases (capital and noncapital), to the courts of
appeals, all the while defining the appellate powers as the power to
111
review “final decisions” of the lower courts. Finally, in the Act of
March 3, 1911, Congress settled on the language which, for the most part,
remains today: “The circuit courts of appeals shall exercise appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal or writ of error final decisions in the
112
district courts.” Congress first codified this language in the Judicial
Code at 28 U.S.C. § 225 and again, with minor changes, in the revised
113
Judicial Code at 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
B. The Scope of Jurisdiction over Sentence Appeals Prior to the
SRA
As the above history shows, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and its predecessor
statutes have provided for appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases since at
least the Judiciary Act of 1891. But while the power to take a criminal
appeal is firmly established, the scope of appellate jurisdiction in criminal
cases is less clear. Exactly what could appellate courts do on appeal in a
criminal case?
Courts frequently cite two lines of cases for the proposition that the
appellate “powers” of the courts of appeals do not extend to reviewing
the length of a criminal sentence. In one line of cases, starting with
Freeman v. United States, courts held that Congress affirmatively
withdrew such jurisdiction from the appellate courts through the
114
Judiciary Act of 1891. In the other, exemplified by cases such as
Dorszynski v. United States, courts do not rely on a specific jurisdictional
statute, but instead describe a policy of deference to sentencing courts
115
that precludes review. Each is analyzed in turn.

§ 1291.”); United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1322 n.7 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Congress created
intermediate courts of appeals in 1891. The very act that created the courts of appeals conferred on
them the power to review final judgments in almost all civil and criminal cases. Recodified and
technically amended, § 6 of the 1891 Act exists essentially unchanged today as 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”
(internal citations omitted)).
111. See Act of Jan. 20, 1897, ch. 68, 29 Stat. 492 (deleting “or otherwise infamous” from § 5 of the
Judiciary Act of 1891, effectively transferring appellate jurisdiction of all but capital cases to the circuit
courts of appeals); see also Act of Mar. 3, 1911 §§ 128, 236, 238 (withdrawing from the Supreme Court
and transferring to the courts of appeals appellate jurisdiction over capital cases).
112. § 128.
113. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324 & n.1, 325–26 & n.4 (1940) (reviewing
history of the final decision statute); Dugan & McNamara v. Clark, 170 F.2d 118, 119 (3d Cir. 1948)
(“[28 U.S.C. § 1291] conforms to the former Section 128(a) of the Judicial Code, as amended, 28
U.S.C.A. § 225(a)”).
114. 243 F. 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1917).
115. 418 U.S. 424, 440–42 (1974).
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Freeman and the Power to Modify Sentences

As I explained above, the Act of 1879 enabled the circuit courts
both to question the legality of convictions and to modify sentences on
appeal. But Congress, in defining the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of
Appeals in 1891, failed to include the language from the Act of 1879 that
gave the circuit courts the power to “pronounce final sentence.” Courts
split in interpreting how this omission affected the appellate jurisdiction
of the Circuit Courts of Appeals.
Some courts thought Congress’s decision to omit this language
meant that Congress had repealed the power to modify sentences on
116
appeal by implication. In Freeman v. United States, the leading case
espousing this limited view, the defendant asked the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals to “modify [his] sentence and judgment” and release him
117
from prison. The defendant argued that, “in consideration of the nature
of the testimony” presented at trial, the court should modify his one-year
118
sentence for mail fraud. The Freeman court declined, holding that
under the Judiciary Act of 1891, Congress only gave the court the power
119
to “review” final decisions, not to “pronounce final sentence.”
According to the Freeman court, Congress’s decision to delete the
language “pronounce final sentence” from the Judiciary Act of 1891
meant that appellate courts no longer had the power to revise sentences
120
on appeal. Accordingly, the court stated broadly, the question of “the
nature of the sentence” was entirely in the discretion of the trial court,
and the appellate court “will not [review]” the sentence as long as it is
121
within statutory limits.

116. See United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604 n.25 (2d Cir. 1952) (discussing the impact of
the Judiciary Act of 1891 on the appellate power to modify sentences).
117. 243 F. at 357.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 176, 20 Stat. 354).
120. See id.
121. Id. Prior to the Judiciary Act of 1891, a district judge could sit on the circuit court appellate
panel that heard the appeal of his own decision. Charles Alan Wright & Mary Kay Kane, Law of
Federal Courts 6 (6th ed. 2002). In light of this, it is possible that Congress only allowed modification
of sentences prior to 1891 under the theory that the circuit court would be just as knowledgeable about
the intricacies of the case as the district judge—indeed, they could be the same person. Later, in
section 3 of the Judiciary Act of 1891, Congress changed this, providing that “no . . . judge before
whom a cause or question may have been tried or heard . . . shall sit on the trial or hearing of such
cause or question in the circuit court of appeals.” Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 3, 26 Stat. 826, 827.
One could deduce that Congress eliminated the appellate power to modify sentences in the same Act
as a corollary to the decision to eliminate the same judges at trial and on appeal. However, I think this
unlikely for two reasons. First, according to at least one scholar, Erwin Surrency, judges did not
usually hear appeals of their own cases, despite their theoretical ability to do so. As he explains, circuit
court judges could be called upon to fill in for such appeals. Surrency, supra note 71, at 218. It is
unlikely that Congress would give all circuit courts the ability to modify sentences on appeal if it was
intending to target only a certain type of appeal that rarely happened. Furthermore, in prohibiting
district judges from hearing appeals of their own decisions, Congress sought to ensure a fair and
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Other courts took the opposite view, arguing that the appellate
courts’ power to modify sentences on appeal survived the Judiciary Act
of 1891. Section 11 provided, “All provisions of law now in force
regulating the methods and system of review, through appeals or writs of
error, shall regulate the methods and system of appeals and writs of error
122
provided for in this act in respect of the circuit court of appeals.” If the
writ of error encompassed the same powers after the Judiciary Act of
1891 as before, then the power to modify sentences, incorporated into
the writ by the Act of 1879, should also have survived the Judiciary Act
of 1891. The leading case supporting this view is Hanley v. United
123
States, a 1903 Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision. In that case,
the court ordered a reduction of the defendant’s sentence for mail fraud,
asserting that section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1891 encompasses the
124
power granted by the Act of 1879 to “pronounce final sentence.”
This latter view, espoused by the Hanley court, has found strong
support in the literature. As several scholars have pointed out, the
Hanley court’s expansive view of section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1891
125
In its report to Congress
is supported by legislative history.
accompanying the Judiciary Act of 1891, the House Committee on the
Judiciary advised Congress that the Act “provides that the circuit courts
of the United States shall exercise such jurisdiction . . . as they have and
126
exercise under existing laws.” The Committee further stated that the
Judiciary Act of 1891
destroys the “judicial despotism” of the present system by creating an
intermediate appellate court, with power to revise the final judgments

uninfluenced look at the judgment below. 13D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3545 (3d ed. 2008). In light of this, it is highly unlikely that Congress meant to eliminate
review of the substance of the sentencing decision altogether, which could decrease fairness in
sentencing, even if Congress intended to remove the ability to modify sentences.
122. § 11.
123. 123 F. 849, 854–55 (2d Cir. 1903).
124. Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1879 § 3). In Hanley, the Second Circuit reversed the defendant’s
sentence due to legal error, not based on a general claim of excessiveness. Id. However, the point
remains that the court considered section 11 of the Act of 1891 to encompass the former powers to
“pronounce final sentence.” Id.
125. See Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 60, at 467–68; see also Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S.
187, 201–02 (1895) (interpreting section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1891 to incorporate the Supreme
Court’s former statutory power to direct the district courts, on remand, to resentence the defendant in
conformity with the Court’s decision); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604 n.25 (2d Cir.
1952) (noting that Ballew and Hanley “strongly suggest that the statutory powers given in the 1879 law
to circuit courts had been incorporated by reference in the 1891 statute setting up the circuit courts of
appeal,” but continuing to abide by the Freeman rule in recognition of its firm entrenchment in
sentencing jurisprudence); Recent Cases: Criminal Procedure—Federal Court of Appeals Vacates
Sentence on Grounds of Severity and Remands to District Court for Resentencing, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev.
422, 423 n.13 (1961); cf. United States ex rel. John Davis Co. v. Ill. Sur. Co., 226 F. 653, 664 (7th Cir.
1915) (holding, in a civil case, that it had the power “the power to modify, as well as to affirm or
reverse, any judgment of the District Court”).
126. H.R. Rep. No. 51-1295, at 1 (1890).
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of the district courts in all cases, civil and criminal, except . . . where the
127
fine is not over $300 and does not involve imprisonment.

Despite strong support for its view, the Hanley court’s position did
not carry the day. Courts and scholars have cited Freeman and the like
for the proposition that, at least until the SRA in 1984, the federal
appellate courts did not have jurisdiction to review the length of
sentences as long as those sentences lay within the limitations provided
128
by statute.
But Freeman does not stand for such a broad proposition. Even if,
as the Freeman court held, appellate courts no longer have jurisdiction to
modify a sentence on appeal, there is nothing in the Freeman case or
other early cases that restricts appellate courts’ power to scrutinize
sentences for error and to remand for resentencing under the final
decision statute. Although the Freeman court, relying on the Judiciary
Act of 1891, held that it could not review the severity of an otherwise
129
legal sentence on appeal, it did so in the context of the defendant’s
argument that “in consideration of the nature of the testimony,” the
court “should modify the sentence and judgment, so as to omit [his]
130
imprisonment.” The opinion does not indicate that the defendant in
Freeman would have been satisfied with a consolation prize—a decision
vacating the sentence and remanding for resentencing. It is easy to
conceive of possible reasons why a defendant might want the appellate
court to issue a sentence rather than the trial court—the most obvious
being if the district court judge was known to impose harsh sentences.
Regardless of the defendant’s reasons, however, the issue in Freeman
was whether the Circuit Courts of Appeals retained the power to modify
sentences on their own, and not whether the Circuit Courts of Appeals
could review a sentence for some kind of error (including excessiveness)
and remand for resentencing. As such, modern courts should be wary of
citing Freeman and other early cases interpreting the Judiciary Act of
1891 for the proposition that the courts of appeals have no jurisdiction to
review sentences within statutory limits. So long as an “unreasonable
sentence” constitutes an “error” as the Supreme Court now says it does,
127. Id. at 3.
128. See Brief for the Hon. Orrin G. Hatch et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8–9,
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Nos. 04-104, 04-105) (citing Freeman for the proposition
that the Judiciary Act of 1891 “impliedly repealed appellate jurisdiction over sentencing”); see also
United States v. Wilson, 450 F.2d 495, 498 (4th Cir. 1971) (“The statutory authority to review
sentences, exercised on appeal from 1789 to 1891, is thought to have been removed by
implication . . . .” (citing Freeman v. United States, 243 F. 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1917)); Witt v. United
States, 287 F.2d 389, 393 (9th Cir. 1961) (“The sentence being within the limits allowed by the statute,
this court has no authority to lessen or in any way change the sentence.” (citing Brown v. United
States, 222 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1955); Freeman, 243 F. at 357)).
129. See Freeman v. United States, 243 F. 353, 357 (1917) (holding that court would not “review”
the sentence “where the punishment assessed is within the statutory limits”).
130. Id.
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neither Freeman nor the Judiciary Act of 1891 bars review of that
sentence.
2.

Dorszynski and Discretionary Limits on Appeals of Sentencing
Decisions

As the above statutory history shows, the courts of appeals have had
the power, under statute, to review criminal sentences since at least the
Judiciary Act of 1891. Nevertheless, many courts still deny such a power
existed prior to the SRA, citing the longstanding rule—most famously
quoted in the 1974 Supreme Court case, Dorszynski v. United States—
that courts of appeals will not disturb the decisions of lower courts
131
regarding the length of sentences that fall within statutory limits. So
long as a district court sentences a defendant below the statutory
maximum, the rule goes, an appellate court cannot question the suitability
132
of the sentence.
Despite this seemingly strict limitation on the “powers” of the
appellate courts, a review of the cases in this area shows that the rule of
nonreview referred to in Dorszynski and like cases is not jurisdictional,
but policy-based. As Chief Judge Anthony Scirica articulated in the
majority opinion in United States v. Cooper, the rule of nonreview “was
based not on a lack of jurisdiction, but on the wide discretion of
133
This
sentencing courts which made reversal nearly impossible.”
distinction makes all the difference: while the Supreme Court may not
expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts, it may, through its ability to
regulate the functions of the lower courts, change the level of deference
the appellate courts give to district court decisions—including sentencing
134
decisions.
131. 418 U.S. 424, 440–41 (1974); see also United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 336 (3d Cir. 2006)
(Aldisert, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[O]nce it is determined that a sentence is within the
limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end.” (quoting
Dorszynski, 418 U.S. at 431)); United States v. Simmons, 92 F.3d 1169, 1169 (1st Cir. 1996)
(unpublished opinion) (“[W]e have no jurisdiction to consider an appeal from sentence that was within
the applicable guideline range and was correctly determined.”).
132. Dorszynski, 418 U.S. at 440–41; see also Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (“The
sentence being within the limits set by the statute, its severity would not be grounds for relief here
even on direct review of the conviction, much less on review of the state court’s denial of habeas
corpus.”); United States v. Ruiz-Garcia, 886 F.2d 474, 476–77 (1st Cir. 1989) (“For almost a century,
conventional wisdom taught that: ‘If there is one rule in the federal criminal practice which is firmly
established, it is that the appellate court has no control over a sentence which is within the limits
allowed by a statute.’” (quoting Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340–41 (8th Cir. 1930))).
133. 437 F.3d at 327 n.4 (majority opinion) (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996);
United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. McAndrews, 12 F.3d 273,
276–77 (1st Cir. 1993); S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 150 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3333.))
134. See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 219 n.17 (1992) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that
the Court must expand the scope of appellate review of sentences because Congress, through the
SRA, withdrew some of the previous “near-absolute discretion” of the district courts); Yates v. United
States, 356 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1958) (per curiam) (recognizing that reduction of a sentence normally
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First, a word about the confusion between deference and
jurisdiction. Appellate courts usually “defer” to a lower court’s decisions
when, due to some judicial or statutory policy, the judgments of the
lower court are valued over that of the appellate court. For example,
appellate courts defer to the trial courts’ decisions as to the impartiality
or credibility of jurors on voir dire because trial courts are in a better
135
position to evaluate demeanor evidence and responses to questions.
How much deference is given is reflected in the scope of review, also
called the “standard of review.” The standard of review is the level of
scrutiny with which an appellate court will evaluate a lower court’s
decision. Thus, the broader the standard of review, the more expansive in
136
scope the appellate court’s examination will be. Appellate jurisdiction,
on the other hand, is the power of a particular appellate court to review
the lower court’s decision in the first place. As noted earlier, “No court,
including the United States Supreme Court, has the power to promulgate
a declaration of jurisdiction. That remains the exclusive province of
137
Congress within the boundaries set forth by the Constitution.” A
standard of review, by contrast, may be defined either by Congress or by
the courts.
The confusion between jurisdiction and standard of review is
greatest when the standard of review is a narrow one. It is easy to
mistake deference to a lower court’s decision for a lack of power to
138
overturn that decision. This is especially the case when the Supreme
Court itself sends mixed messages on the issue. On the one hand, the
Court has routinely made it clear that appellate courts have jurisdiction
to review sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In Arizona v. Manypenny,
the Court explained, “it is settled that . . . an appeal by the defendant in a
criminal case, may be taken from any final decision of a District Court”

ought not to be made by a reviewing court, but nevertheless exercising its “supervisory power over the
administration of justice in the lower federal courts” by setting aside a sentence of the district court);
see also Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454–56 (2004) (suggesting that because time constraints are
“claim-processing rules” and are not “jurisdictional,” they can be altered; so, unlike when parties raise
jurisdictional issues, assertions of untimeliness can be waived “if the party asserting the rule waits too
long to raise the point”); authorities cited supra note 65.
135. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981).
136. For a thorough discussion of standards of review, scope of review, and examples of the
varying levels of deference to trial court decisions, see 1 Steven Alan Childress & Martha S. Davis,
Federal Standards of Review (4th ed. 2010); J. Dickson Phillips, Jr., The Appellate Review Function:
Scope of Review, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1984, at 1; Maurice Rosenberg, Standards of Review,
in Restructuring Justice: The Innovations of the Ninth Circuit and the Future of the Federal
Courts 30 (Arthur D. Hellman ed. 1991).
137. Cooper, 437 F.3d at 339 (Aldisert, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
138. See United States v. Minutoli, 374 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2004) (recognizing that the lack of
“power” to review discretionary decisions not to depart had been described by the courts as both
“jurisdictional” and as deferential to the sentencing courts’ “unfettered discretion”).
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139

under § 1291. And over forty years earlier, in Berman v. United States,
the Court defined the term “final judgment” in the context of a criminal
case: “Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is
140
the judgment.”
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has, on a number of occasions,
reviewed sentences for illegality or abuse of discretion, strongly implying
141
the Court’s view that jurisdiction over these appeals exists. As an
example, in the 1958 case United Stated v. Yates, the defendant appealed
her one-year sentence for criminal contempt, which was based on her
refusal to answer questions about the Communist membership of other
142
persons. Contempt is an offense for which there is no statutory
sentencing limit; thus, any sentence, no matter how harsh, falls within
143
“statutory limits.” The Court conceded that, “normally,” a reduction in
144
sentence should be left to the discretion of the trial court. However, the
Court went on to explain:
when in a situation like this the District Court appears not to have
exercised its discretion in the light of the reversal of the judgment but,
in effect, to have sought merely to justify the original sentence, this
Court has no alternative except to exercise its supervisory power over
the administration of justice in the lower federal courts by setting aside
145
the sentence of the District Court.

The Court determined that the seven months the defendant had already
spent in jail was “an adequate punishment,” and ordered the district
146
court to reduce the sentence to time served.

139. 451 U.S. 232, 245 (1981) (holding that § 1291 authorizes a state to appeal from a federal
district court’s judgment of acquittal).
140. 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937). Admittedly, Supreme Court cases such as Berman, which use the
“sentence is the judgment” language, are usually cases questioning whether a decision is sufficiently
“final” so as to trigger appellate review under § 1291. See id. at 213 (holding that defendant’s
conviction was “final” and appealable under § 1291 despite the fact that the district court suspended
the sentence). The Court has not specifically stated that sentences themselves (as opposed to the
conviction) are final decisions reviewable under § 1291. But actions can speak louder than words. The
Supreme Court has reviewed sentencing decisions on a number of occasions, strongly implying the
Court’s view that jurisdiction over these appeals exists, presumably under § 1291 authority. See United
States v. McAndrews, 12 F.3d 273, 276–77 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that before the sentencing
guidelines were enacted, courts of appeals had jurisdiction over sentencing appeals under § 1291,
though the wide discretion afforded to sentencing judges narrowed the scope of the appellate review).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 433, 447 (1972) (remanding for resentencing when
the sentence was based in part on three prior convictions, two of which were unconstitutional); Yates
v. United States, 356 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1958) (per curiam) (remanding to the district court with
instructions to reduce the sentence to time served based on the district court’s refusal to exercise
judgment); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (reversing the defendant’s convictions for
burglary and robbery based on the illegality of the sentencing procedure).
142. 356 U.S. at 364–66.
143. See id. (deciding the case without referring to any statutory minimum or maximum).
144. Id. at 366.
145. Id. at 366–67.
146. Id. at 367. Interestingly, the Yates decision came twenty-six years after the Court, in
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Following similar logic, the courts of appeals routinely reviewed
sentencing decisions of the district courts up until the passage of the
SRA. Generally, “sentences that were imposed above statutory limits,
that were the result of material misinformation, or that were based on a
147
constitutionally impermissible factor” were reviewable on appeal.
Courts of appeals also reviewed and reversed sentences if the trial court
failed to exercise its discretion, for example by refusing to consider
148
certain information during sentencing. Furthermore, at least one court
followed the Supreme Court’s example in Yates and imposed its own
sentence upon reversal. In that case, United States v. Daniels, the Sixth
Circuit reversed a five-year sentence imposed on a defendant whose
religious beliefs precluded him from obeying an order of a local selective
149
service board. The court held that the district court did not properly
exercise its discretion when it sentenced the defendant to the maximum
150
sentence. The district court did not consider mitigating evidence, but
instead imposed the same sentence that it had for all other “cases of this
151
kind.” The Sixth Circuit held that this defendant, who was “of ‘good
character’ and of ‘apparent model behavior,’” deserved a much lighter
152
sentence. Accordingly, the court reversed the sentence with directions
that the district court instead impose twenty-five months of probation
and “civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national
153
health, safety or interest.”
Despite this clear record of appellate jurisdiction to review
sentences, the Supreme Court has seemed to deny appellate jurisdiction
to review a district court’s sentencing decision on several occasions—
154
155
most prominently in Townsend v. Burke, United States v. Tucker,

Blockburger v. United States, announced that the Supreme Court has no power to revise sentences
within statutory limits. 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932) (“[I]t is true that the imposition of the full
penalty . . . seems unduly severe; but . . . the matter was one for [the trial] court, with whose judgment
there is no warrant for interference on our part.”). In light of the Court’s holding in Yates, the
deference the Court afforded to sentencing judges in Blockburger should not be taken as synonymous
with lack of jurisdiction.
147. United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Tucker,
404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972)); see 3 Wright et al., supra note 66, § 533, at 330–31 nn. 9–11 (citing cases).
148. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443 (1974) (“Although well-established doctrine
bars review of the exercise of sentencing discretion, limited review is available when sentencing
discretion is not exercised at all.”); see Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 147 (8th Cir. 1973)
(remanding for resentencing a maximum sentence for draft violation by a defendant who refused to
serve as a matter of conscience, holding that the severity of the five-year sentence “shocks the judicial
conscience”); see also 3 Wright et al., supra note 66, § 533, at 332 n.12, 336 n.19 (citing cases).
149. 446 F.2d 967, 972–73 (6th Cir. 1971).
150. Id. at 972.
151. Id. at 969, 973.
152. Id. at 972.
153. Id.
154. See 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).
155. See 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972).
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Gore v. United States, Yates v. United States, Blockburger v. United
158
159
States, and Dorszynski v. United States. So which is it?
At first glance, the language in cases such as Townsend, Tucker,
Gore, Yates, Blockburger, and Dorszynski appears to suggest that the
Court’s policy of nonreview of the length of sentences is based on a lack
of jurisdiction. Each case has a tantalizing “sound bite” that purports to
absolutely bar review. One case that is often cited is Dorszynski, where
the Court, quoting the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, stated, “If there
is one rule in the federal criminal practice which is firmly established, it is
that the appellate court has no control over a sentence which is within
160
the limits allowed by a statute.” The Court’s Blockburger decision is
also routinely cited to support the rule of nonreview. There, the Court
refused to reduce a sentence it considered “unduly severe” because “the
matter was one for [the trial] court, with whose judgment there is no
161
warrant for interference on our part.” Tucker, Gore, Yates, and
Townsend include similar language purporting to limit appellate power
162
to review sentences. To this day, these sound bites are used to justify
holdings that appellate courts do not have “jurisdiction” to review
sentences within statutory limits.
However, as the research of Kutak, Gottschalk, and other authors
163
makes plain, “The Supreme Court support for the rule that federal
164
appellate courts generally may not review a sentence is pure dicta.”
Each of these cases—Townsend, Tucker, Gore, Yates, Blockburger, and
Dorszynski—merely reflects a judicial policy of deference to district
courts regarding the severity of sentences, not a holding regarding the
jurisdiction of the appellate courts. Because much of this field has been
thoroughly covered, only a brief review of these cases follows.
The Supreme Court first articulated the rule of nonreview in

156. See 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958).
157. See 356 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1958) (per curiam).
158. See 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932).
159. See 418 U.S. 424, 440–41 (1974).
160. Id. (quoting Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340–41 (8th Cir. 1930)) (emphasis added).
161. 284 U.S. at 305 (emphasis added).
162. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (“[A] sentence imposed by a federal district
judge, if within statutory limits, is generally not subject to review.”); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S.
386, 393 (1958) (noting the Court had no “power” to revise sentences on appeal); Yates, 356 U.S. at
366 (“[R]eduction of the sentence . . . normally ought not be made by this Court.”); Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (“The sentence being within the limits set by the statute, its severity
would not be grounds for relief here even on direct review of the conviction . . . .”).
163. See Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 60, at 471–76 (analyzing Supreme Court precedent on the
reviewability of sentences); Appellate Review of Sentencing Procedure, supra note 60, at 380–83
(same); see also 3 Wright et al., supra note 66, § 533, at 336 n.20 (citing “extensive literature” written
on the subject of the rule of nonreviewability).
164. Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 142 (8th Cir. 1973) (citing 2 Charles Alan Wright
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 533, at 451–52 (1969)).
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165

Blockburger, decided in 1932. In that case, the petitioner challenged a
statute that allowed him to receive multiple punishments for the
166
commission of a single act. Because that act, a single sale of morphine
hydrochloride, violated two separate criminal statutes, the district court
sentenced Blockburger to two consecutive terms of five years’
167
imprisonment. The Court upheld the sentence, refusing to question
168
Congress’s judgment on the severity of the punishments it chose.
Congress’s intent was clear, the Court held: “[E]ach offense is subject to
169
the penalty prescribed.” Furthermore, “if that be too harsh, the remedy
must be afforded by act of Congress, not by judicial legislation under the
170
guise of construction.” The Court went on to address the trial court’s
decision to impose “the full penalty of fine and imprisonment upon each
count,” and admitted that the district court’s decision “seem[ed] unduly
171
However, the Supreme Court refused to question the
severe.”
sentencing court’s decision, stating “the matter was one for that court,
172
with whose judgment there is no warrant for interference on our part.”
But, in refusing to interfere with that judgment, the Court did not rely on
some lack of power to do so—indeed, the Court did not mention
jurisdiction at all. Instead, the Court acknowledged that “there may have
been other facts and circumstances before the trial court properly
173
influencing the extent of the punishment.” In essence, the Court
deferred to the more knowledgeable judgment of the district court; it did
not make a jurisdictional ruling.
Twelve years later, the Court reviewed another multiple count
174
conviction and sentence in Gore v. United States. In that case, the
175
defendant was arrested for selling narcotics on two separate occasions.
For each sale, the petitioner received three sentences of one-to-five
years’ imprisonment for violating three separate statutes making it illegal
176
to sell, repackage, and conceal narcotics. The defendant argued that

165. See 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932).
166. Id. at 304.
167. Id. at 301.
168. Id. at 305.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
175. Id. at 387.
176. Id. at 387–88. In conjunction with each sale of narcotics, the defendant in Gore was charged
with, found guilty of, and separately punished for: (1) the unlawful sale of drugs except in the original
stamped package; (2) the unlawful sale of drugs except in furtherance of a designated writing; and
(3) the fraudulent concealment of unlawfully imported drugs. Id. at 387. The trial court ordered that
the sentences imposed for the two sales—one to five years—run concurrently. Thus, the total sentence
was three-to-fifteen years. Id. at 388.
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the statute allowing multiple convictions and sentences based on a single
177
act violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The
Court disagreed, stating that the defendant, in essence, asked the Court
178
to “enter the domain of penology.” It declined to do so. As the Court
explained, although the English and Scottish courts of appeal “were
given power to revise sentences,” the Supreme Court “has no such
179
power.”
As with Blockburger’s “no warrant for interference” language,
Gore’s “penology” language has been routinely cited as support for the
proposition that there is no appellate jurisdiction to review the length of
180
sentences. But, as Kutak and Gottschalk point out, the Gore opinion
181
was not about appellate courts’ jurisdiction to review sentences. The
question before the Court was whether Congress intended to allow for
multiple punishments and, if so, whether that intent would violate the
182
Double Jeopardy Clause. Under this analysis, so long as the sentencing
court was allowed, both under statute and the Constitution, to sentence
183
the defendant under three separate statutes, the dispute was at an end.
In addition, the “penology” discussion, almost an afterthought in the
majority opinion, references the power to “revise” sentences on appeal
184
not the jurisdiction to review sentences generally. Accordingly, like
Blockburger, Gore can only be read to reflect two propositions that are
important here: (1) a reaffirmance of the Freeman rule that appellate
courts cannot modify sentences on appeal, and (2) the Court’s significant
deference to congressional decisions regarding the severity of
punishment.
Four other Supreme Court cases are routinely cited to support a
185
lack of jurisdiction to review sentences on appeal: Townsend v. Burke,
186
187
Yates v. United States, United States v. Tucker, and Dorszynski v.
188
United States. However, none of these cases supports the proposition
that sentencing decisions within statutory limits are completely insulated
from appellate scrutiny.

177. Id. at 392.
178. Id. at 393.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Pruitt, 341 F.2d 700, 703–04 (4th Cir. 1965) (citing Gore in support
of its holding that the court was “powerless to review” an otherwise legal sentence within statutory
limits); Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462, 468 (10th Cir. 1959) (same).
181. See Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 60, at 472–73.
182. Gore, 357 U.S. at 390, 392.
183. Id. at 392–93.
184. Id. at 393. Indeed, the Court admits that the power to review sentences continued to be a
“much mooted” point. Id.
185. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
186. 356 U.S. 363 (1958) (per curiam).
187. 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
188. 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
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In three of these cases—Townsend, Yates, and Tucker—the
Supreme Court actually reversed the sentence based on some kind of
189
sentencing error. This fact is often overlooked, but it is important for
our analysis as it shows that sentencing decisions are not, in fact,
unassailable on review. In Townsend, a habeas case decided in 1948, the
Court reversed the defendant’s state convictions for burglary and
190
robbery. There, the sentencing court based the defendant’s sentence in
part on various prior “convictions,” which were really counts of which he
191
was acquitted. The Court first noted in dicta that “[t]he sentence being
within the limits set by the statute, its severity would not be grounds for
relief here even on direct review of the conviction, much less on review
192
of the state court’s denial of habeas corpus.” Nevertheless, the Court
ordered the reversal of the sentence, holding that “the careless or
designed pronouncement of sentence on a foundation so extensively and
materially false, which the prisoner had no opportunity to correct by the
services which counsel would provide . . . renders the proceedings lacking
193
in due process.” This is a far cry from the theory that sentences within
statutory limits are untouchable.
Similarly, in Tucker, a 1972 case, the Court reversed the defendant’s
twenty-five-year sentence for armed bank robbery, a sentence the Court
held was “founded at least in part upon misinformation of constitutional
194
magnitude.” Once again, the district court had sentenced the defendant
based in part on invalid prior convictions; this time two of the
respondent’s previous convictions had been unconstitutionally
195
Despite the fact that the defendant had been validly
obtained.
convicted in the instant case and had received a sentence within the
196
statutory limits, the Court remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
Importantly, the Court’s decision was a constitutional one—that is, that a
189. See Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447 (remanding for resentencing when sentence was based in part on
three prior convictions, two of which were unconstitutional); Yates, 356 U.S. at 366 (remanding to the
district court with instructions to reduce the sentence to time served based on the district court’s
refusal to exercise judgment); Gore, 357 U.S. at 393 (noting the Court had no “power” to revise
sentences on appeal); Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741 (reversing the defendant’s convictions for burglary
and robbery based on the illegality of the sentencing procedure).
190. 334 U.S. at 741. Because Townsend was a habeas case, the Court’s holding reversing the
sentence may not specifically reflect the Court’s opinion as to its powers on direct review. But this only
supports the fact that Townsend cannot be used as a tool to deny appellate jurisdiction to review
federal criminal sentences directly: The Court’s discussion on the severity of sentences is dicta.
Furthermore, the Court in Townsend made it clear that the sentence involved would be
unconstitutional regardless of whether it was on direct review or habeas. See id. Again, this is a far cry
from the prevailing opinion that sentences are unreviewable on appeal.
191. Id.
192. Id. (emphasis omitted).
193. Id.
194. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447.
195. Id. at 448.
196. See id. at 449.
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sentence based on misinformation violated the Constitution—not one of
jurisdiction.
Even more telling is Yates, the Supreme Court case discussed above
197
where the Supreme Court reversed a contempt sentence. Scholars and
judges often cite the following language from Yates as proof that the
sentencing decisions of trial courts are unreviewable: “reduction of the
sentence . . . normally ought not be made by this Court. It should be left,
198
on remand, to the sentencing court.” However, the most important part
of this case is not this dictum but the result: The Court reviewed the trial
199
court’s sentencing decision, set it aside, and imposed its own sentence.
Far from demonstrating that there is no appellate review of sentences,
then, Yates, proves that the Court could, and did, revise a sentence when
necessary.
The most recent, and perhaps the strongest, pronouncement of the
200
rule of nonreview came in Dorszynski v. United States. In that case, the
Court held that the district court’s decision to sentence a youth offender
201
under the Federal Youth Corrections Act as an adult, rather than
opting for alternative treatment under the Act, was a final one,
202
unreviewable on appeal. Citing Gore, Townsend, and Blockburger, the
Court explained that Congress, in providing for alternatives to
incarceration when the youth offender would “benefit” from treatment,
did not mean to abrogate the longstanding rule of deference to the trial
203
court’s sentencing decision. Quoting Blockburger, the Court noted
that, if the failure to sentence the youth offender to alternative treatment
“appears ‘too harsh, the remedy must be afforded by act of Congress, not
204
by judicial legislation under the guise of construction.’” However, even
in the face of this broad judicial-deference stance, the Court still
acknowledged that the sentencing decision is not unassailable. As the
Court explained, “Although well-established doctrine bars review of the
exercise of sentencing discretion, limited review is available when
205
sentencing discretion is not exercised at all.” Accordingly, although the
Court declined to question the “harshness” of the sentence imposed by
the district court, it did review the sentencing decision to ensure that the
206
sentencing judge properly exercised his discretion.
Of course, it is hard to ignore the fact that the Court uses the “bars

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
356 U.S. 363, 366 (1958) (per curiam).
Id. at 367.
418 U.S. 424 (1974).
Ch. 1115, 64 Stat. 1085 (1950) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005–5056 (1976)) (repealed 1984).
Dorszynski, 418 U.S. at 425–26, 443.
Id. at 440–42.
Id. at 442 (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932)).
Id. at 443.
See id. at 444.
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review” language in Dorszynski, seeming to imply that appellate
jurisdiction ends as soon as it can be determined that the district court in
fact exercised its discretion. But several factors counsel against such a
broad reading of Dorszynski. First, the cases the Court relied on, namely
Gore, Townsend, and Blockburger, do not stand for the proposition that
other parts of the sentencing decision, including the lengths of sentences,
are unassailable. In fact, as I have shown, these cases support the
proposition that some judicial, legislative, and/or constitutional principles
may trump judicial deference. Such would not be the case if judicial
deference is grounded in jurisdictional roots, rather than simple policy.
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, Dorszynski was not a
jurisdiction case. The Court did not mention or analyze a single
jurisdictional statute. The Court’s only concern was whether Congress
meant to abrogate the “traditional” deference to sentencing decisions by
requiring a “no benefit” finding for sentencing a youth offender as an
207
adult. The Court said no. It canvassed the legislative history of the
Federal Youth Corrections Act and found that “the Act was meant to
208
enlarge, not restrict, the sentencing options of federal trial courts.”
Appellate review of the “no benefit” decision, which would necessarily
209
restrict these options, was, therefore, not warranted. Assuming, then,
that in future cases, some principle, be it legislative, constitutional, or
judicial, does warrant appellate review, there should be no jurisdictional
bar to expanding the review of sentences.
A review of the cases above provides several principles. First,
traditionally, the mere fact that a sentence is “severe” was never a
ground for overturning it—some other justification was required.
Second, courts do not question policy decisions made by Congress on the
proper punishment for particular offenses. And third, appellate courts
usually cannot reduce or increase a sentence on their own—that is the
province of the trial courts. But these cases do not stand for the broader
proposition that appellate powers to review sentencing decisions are
somehow limited jurisdictionally. In each of the above cases, the Court
relied on policies of deference to congressional penological decisions and
trial sentencing decisions—policies which can give way, and have given
way, to superior principles.
There are many legitimate reasons for the appellate courts to be
reluctant to interfere with the sentencing process, including respect for
the expertise of the trial judge who is most familiar with the facts of the
case, recognition of the difficulty of sentencing, and the availability of
210
other alternatives for relief, such as the executive pardoning power.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See id. at 440.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 443.
See Gall v. United States, 522 U.S. 38, 51–52 (2007); see also United States v. Rosenberg,
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However, there is little explanation of why the courts have, over time,
mischaracterized this reluctance as a jurisdictional limitation, rather than
what it is: a policy choice. This is doubly confusing, considering the great
number of federal appellate courts that have reviewed criminal
211
sentences, albeit under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. As
Justice Alito recently noted, “Appellate review for abuse of discretion is
not an empty formality. A decision calling for the exercise of judicial
discretion ‘hardly means that it is unfettered by meaningful standards or
212
shielded from thorough appellate review.’”
So why the confusion? Modern courts seem to cite the above cases
for no better reason than some kind of common law inertia. Judicial
opinions are considered well-founded if grounded in prior decisional law;
accordingly, judges and law clerks can be tempted to look no further
than the last case found with a convenient sound bite. Unfortunately,
these sound bites can be taken out of context and may not actually
213
support the decisions at hand. A further complication is the hierarchy
of case law in the federal common law system. Lower courts must follow
the decisions of higher courts, regardless of errors found therein. Thus,
judges often feel compelled to follow incorrect pronouncements of other
courts, despite clear evidence of error. For example, in the 1952 case
United States v. Rosenberg, Judge Frank felt he could not modify a death
sentence imposed on Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for their part in
214
providing information to the Soviet Union during wartime. After
reviewing the history of the final decision statute and determining that
the statute did allow courts of appeals to modify sentences on appeal,
Judge Frank went on to explain that “sixty years of undeviating federal
215
precedents” required that he hold otherwise. His proverbial hands
were tied, and the death sentences had to stand.
These two forces—common law inertia and hierarchy of decisional
law—have so firmly entrenched the jurisdictional basis of the rule of
nonreview that one must go back decades, as I have, to find the original
basis of the rule. Doing so shows that the rule of nonreview, while
195 F.2d 583, 607 n.30 (2d Cir. 1952). For a general discussion of the different levels of deference to
trial court decisions and the reasons for such deference, see Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of
the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635 (1971).
211. See authorities cited supra notes 147–53.
212. Gall, 552 U.S. at 68 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 416 (1975)).
213. As an example, in his dissent in Cooper, Judge Aldisert cites Dorszynski to support the
conclusion that the Supreme Court did not have the power in Booker to expand appellate jurisdiction
beyond the limited “jurisdiction” available before the SRA. See United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324,
336–37 (3d Cir. 2006) (Aldisert, J., concurring and dissenting). But, as explained above, see supra text
accompanying notes 206–09, Dorszynski was not a case about jurisdiction, but about respect for
sentencing discretion.
214. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d at 604.
215. Id.
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certainly an important policy in federal common law, is based on a policy
of deference to the sentencing judge, not on some statutory jurisdictional
limit.

III. Review of Criminal Sentences After the SRA: The Impact of
§ 3742 on Appellate Jurisdiction
The above analysis shows that, at least up until 1984, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 provided appellate courts with the jurisdiction to review sentences
within statutory limits. However, a narrow scope of review over
sentencing decisions made reversal nearly impossible. With few
exceptions, appellate courts before 1984 limited their review of
sentencing appeals to three basic types of claims: (1) that a sentence was
outside the statutory maximum, (2) that a sentence was based on
impermissible considerations, and (3) that a sentence was the result of
216
some other type of error. As previously discussed, the limited nature of
review stemmed from deference, not a lack of jurisdiction.
However, all this changed in 1984 with the SRA. Prior to the SRA’s
implementation, there was widespread concern among politicians and
commentators that the almost limitless discretion given to sentencing
courts led to inconsistent and unfair sentencing practices. Sentencing
judges were imposing an “unjustifiably wide range of sentences to
offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes, committed
217
under similar circumstances.” To remedy this, Congress created the
Guidelines. The Guidelines, established by the SRA, required sentencing
judges to impose specific lengths of sentences according to a
218
mathematical formula. Congress designed this formula to take into
account all facts that could possibly arise in a particular case, including,
for example, the conviction offense, the defendant’s prior offenses, and
whether the defendant used a gun in the commission of the conviction
219
offense. Once a sentencing judge plugged these factors into the

216. United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1553 (2d Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Hack,
782 F.2d 862, 870 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363, 366–367 (1958); United
States v. Thompson, 680 F.2d 1145, 1149 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Prazak, 623 F.2d 152, 155
(10th Cir. 1980)); United States v. Brown, 382 F.2d 52, 52–53 (3d Cir. 1967) (citing Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); United States v. Ginzburg, 398 F.2d 52, 63–64 (3d Cir. 1968) (Van Dusen,
J., dissenting); United States v. Frank, 245 F.2d 284, 288 (3d Cir. 1957)).
217. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 38 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221; id. at 37–50
(discussing background of the SRA and disparate sentencing); see also United States v. JiménezBeltre, 440 F.3d 514, 522 (1st Cir. 2006) (Howard, J., concurring) (same); United States v. Denardi,
892 F.2d 269, 279–80 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J., concurring and dissenting) (same).
218. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000); see also discussion supra note 3.
219. See generally U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 2010 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual &
Supplement (2010). For a thorough review of the rationale, history, and outline of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, see generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1 (1988); Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring
Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 883, 894–
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calculus, the Guidelines generated a narrow sentence range that the
220
judge—with limited exceptions—had to use.
Each specific range reflected what Congress, through the Sentencing
Commission, believed to be the proper punishment for each crime and
the particular circumstances involved. If applied properly, every defendant
in America convicted of the same crime, and under similar
circumstances, would be sentenced to the same term of imprisonment,
give or take a few months. The district courts had little power to deviate
from these narrow sentencing ranges, as Congress made application of
the Guidelines mandatory and provided for only a limited ability to
221
depart.
To ensure that the SRA would be implemented as Congress
planned, Congress also provided for a wider review of sentencing
decisions. It did so through § 3742(a), which provides,
A defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review
of an otherwise final sentence if the sentence:
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
sentencing guidelines; or
(3) is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline
range . . . ; or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing
222
guideline and is plainly unreasonable.

Congress also provided a similar list of appealable sentences by the
government in § 3742(b). That list mirrors the defendants’ list in all
respects except one: under § 3742(b)(3), Congress gave the government
the right to appeal sentences imposed below the guidelines range, rather
223
than sentences above the guidelines range.
The scope of § 3742, which purports to list the kinds of sentences
defendants and the government “may” appeal, is a much debated point.
Most important to our analysis is how § 3742 affects the jurisdiction of
appellate courts over appeals of criminal sentences, if at all. This
question is the primary focus of the remainder of this Article.
A. Deconstructing the Majority View: “Unreasonable” Sentences
Are Not “in Violation of Law” Under § 3742(a)(1)
The language of the statute itself is a logical starting point for

99 (1990).
220. § 3553(b)(1) (prohibiting departure from the Guidelines unless the court finds aggravating or
mitigating circumstances not adequately taken into account by the Sentencing Commission when
formulating the Guidelines).
221. Id.
222. Id. § 3742(a).
223. Id. § 3742(b)(3).
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determining its scope. The types of appeals listed in § 3742(a)(2)–(4)
address sentencing appeals on issues related to the Guidelines
224
themselves. Congress designed these provisions to ensure greater
scrutiny over sentencing decisions that did not comply in some way with
225
the sentencing scheme enacted by Congress. In addition, Congress
included § 3742(a)(1) to address sentences involving some legal error.
Conspicuously missing from this list of appealable sentences is
review of “lawful” sentences that fall within the properly applied
guidelines range. That is, if the defendant cannot claim some legal error
in the sentence—either in the implementation of the Guidelines or some
other type of error, such as a constitutional error—§ 3742 does not
appear to allow for an appeal. As an example, shortly after the
implementation of the SRA, defendants began to request that sentencing
judges impose sentences below the guidelines range for various reasons
not considered by the Guidelines, including, for example, that the
sentence suggested by the Guidelines does not adequately take into
226
account mitigating circumstances, such as a defendant’s drug addiction.
In deciding not to grant these requests, referred to as requests for
227
“downward departures,” district courts often had to make subjective
228
value judgments with which defendants could easily take issue. But,
because a failure to depart downward necessarily results in a withinguidelines sentence, § 3742(a)(2)–(4) could not provide the justification
229
for an appeal of the sentence.
To solve this problem, defendants turned to § 3742(a): appeals of

224. Id. § 3742(a)(2)–(a)(4).
225. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 151 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3334 (“Appellate
review of sentences is essential to assure that the guidelines are applied properly and to provide case
law development of the appropriate reasons for sentencing outside the guidelines.”).
226. See, e.g., United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding no jurisdiction to
review on appeal whether the district judge erred when he declined to depart downward from an
eighteen-to-twenty-four month sentencing range in consideration of defendant’s drug addiction and
the relatively small amount of drugs involved).
227. A decision to sentence outside the guidelines range is called a “departure.” A “downward
departure” occurs when the district court sentences below the guidelines range, and an “upward
departure” occurs when the court sentences above the guidelines range.
228. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (“It has been uniform and constant in the
federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual
and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify,
the crime and the punishment to ensue.”); United States v. Williams, 65 F.3d 301, 309–10 (2d Cir.
1995) (“[T]he Sentencing Guidelines do not displace the ‘traditional role of the district court in
bringing compassion and common sense to the sentencing process.’ In areas where the Sentencing
Commission has not spoken . . . district courts should not hesitate to use their discretion in devising
sentences that provide individualized justice . . . .” (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Rogers,
972 F.2d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 1992))).
229. Section 3742(a) also fails to provide for appeals by defendants of downward departures—in
other words, arguments that the sentencing court did not depart enough from the Guidelines.
Similarly, the government could not complain about insufficient upward departures though § 3742(b).
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sentences “in violation of law.” Defendants argued that when a
sentencing judge incorrectly discounted certain mitigating circumstances,
such as a defendant’s drug addiction, the resulting sentence was imposed
231
“in violation of law” under § 3742(a)(1). But this argument was fatally
flawed. Congress could not have intended § 3742(a)(1) to cover “any
arguable claim of error in sentencing, including a claim that a particular
232
sentence is unreasonably high or low.” Interpreting § 3742(a)(1) as
233
such would render the rest of § 3742(a) superfluous. Why, indeed,
would Congress need to spell out the specific sentencing decisions in
§ 3742(a)(2)–(4) if § 3742(a)(1) covered all arguable claims of error? It
would not. Not surprisingly, the courts roundly rejected this argument,
universally agreeing that Congress intended § 3742(a)(1) to cover only
those types of appeals that were available before the SRA, including
appeals of sentences outside the statutory maximum, sentences based on
“impermissible considerations,” and sentences that were the result of
234
some other type of legal error not covered by the Guidelines.
The impact of this view on the circuit courts’ pre-SRA appellate
jurisdiction is clear: If Congress intended § 3742(a)(1) to cover the preSRA avenues of appeal, it follows that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 could no longer
be relied on to provide jurisdiction over appeals of sentencing decisions.
For this reason, most courts agreed, and continue to agree, that § 3742 is
“the exclusive avenue through which a party can appeal a sentence in a
235
criminal case.”

230. § 3742(a).
231. E.g., Colon, 884 F.2d at 1554. In these appeals, defendants mainly argued that, in failing to
depart under certain circumstances, sentencing courts violated 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) or (b). See David N.
Yellen, Commentary, Appellate Review of Refusals to Depart, 1 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 264, 264 (1988)
(listing the possible bases by which refusals to depart could be appealable as violations of law under
§ 3742(a)(1)); see also United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 275–85 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (arguing that a refusal to depart is appealable under § 3742(a)(1) as a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). Section 3553(a) states that a sentence shall be “sufficient, but no
greater than necessary, to comply” with the statutory purposes of sentencing (including retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), and § 3553(b) required that the sentencing judge
“impose a sentence” within the appropriate Guidelines range unless the judge “finds that there exists
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance . . . not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), (b) (2006). The courts of
appeals rejected these arguments. See, e.g., Colon, 884 F.2d at 1553–56; United States v. Denardi,
892 F.2d 269, 270–72 (3d Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Franz, 886 F.2d 973, 979 n.7 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting argument made by
commentators).
232. Colon, 884 F.2d at 1553; see also Denardi, 892 F.2d at 271–72 (majority opinion).
233. Denardi, 892 F.2d at 272; see also United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 338–39 (3d Cir. 2006)
(Aldisert, J., concurring and dissenting).
234. Colon, 884 F.2d at 1552.
235. United States v. McAndrews, 12 F.3d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 1993) (“In the post-guidelines era,
then, only sentences that meet the criteria [listed] in section 3742 are amenable to appellate review.”);
see also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 627 (2002) (suggesting an agreement with the courts of
appeals that § 3742 provides the exclusive avenue for appeals of criminal sentences when it considered

Rosenbaum-62-HLJ-865 (Do Not Delete)

March 2011]

4/28/2011 12:26 PM

RIGHTING THE HISTORICAL RECORD

903

This position—that Congress meant courts of appeals to consult
only § 3742 when determining their jurisdiction over sentencing
appeals—is strongly supported both by the statutory language and in the
legislative history. Sections 3742(a) and (b) provide: “A defendant [or
the Government] may file a notice of appeal in the district court for
review of an otherwise final sentence if the sentence [meets the listed
236
criteria].” The use of the words “may” and “if” here suggests that
notices of appeal cannot be filed in any unlisted circumstances. That is,
unless one of the listed criteria is present, a defendant cannot appeal.
This makes the listed criteria the exclusive avenues of appeal.
This “exclusivity” reading is also supported by legislative history. In
the report accompanying the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983,
which included the SRA, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported
that:
[S]ection 3742 creates for the first time a comprehensive system of
review of sentences that permits the appellate process to focus attention
on those sentences whose review is crucial to the functioning of the
sentencing guidelines system, while also providing adequate means for
237
correction of erroneous and clearly unreasonable sentences.

As the report further explains, these dual goals would be accomplished
by providing “a limited practice of appellate review of sentences,” which
would “provide a practical basis for distinguishing the cases where review
238
is most needed from those where appeal would likely be frivolous.”
Thus, review of sentences would be “confin[ed]” to those cases listed in
239
§ 3742.
Further amendments made by Congress to various criminal statutes
also reflect Congress’s intent to establish this comprehensive and
exclusive scheme of sentencing appeals through § 3742. In other portions
of the SRA—18 U.S.C. §§ 3562(b), 3572(c), and 3582(b)—Congress
defined sentences to a fine, to a term of imprisonment, and to a term of
240
probation as “final judgments.” And in §§ 3562(b), 3572(c), and
3582(b), Congress further provided that, notwithstanding their “final
judgment” status, all three types of sentences could be corrected or

whether a limited reading of § 3742 “blocked” the Court’s consideration of defendant’s sentence
appeal). But see United States v. Fossett, 881 F.2d 976, 978–79 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that § 1291
still provided jurisdiction over appeals of refusals to downward-depart, and § 3742 merely “defines the
claims that the court of appeals may hear in reviewing an appeal”).
236. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), (b) (2006) (emphasis added).
237. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 155 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3338 (emphasis
added).
238. Id. at 149, 154 (emphasis added).
239. Id. at 150; see United States v. Franz, 886 F.2d 973, 978–80 (7th Cir. 1989) (analyzing the
legislative history behind the SRA to support its holding that only those sentences listed in § 3742 are
appealable).
240. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3562(b), 3572(c), 3582(b) (2006).
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modified either (1) by the trial court, or (2) on appeal under § 3742.
These statutes do not mention appeals through other avenues, such as
§ 1291.
Furthermore, Congress’s changes to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as part of the SRA, also reflect an intent to make
§ 3742 the exclusive avenue for appeal of criminal sentences. Prior to the
SRA, Rule 35 allowed a sentencing judge to “correct an illegal sentence
242
at any time.” Congress amended Rule 35(a) to allow a district court to
amend a sentence only by correcting the sentence on remand after
243
“appeal under 18 U.S.C. [§] 3742.” It did so “in order to accord with
244
the provisions of proposed Section 3742.” The fact that Congress took
pains to articulate a single avenue for appeal in §§ 3562(b), 3572(c), and
3582(b), as well as Rule 35, provides further support for the fact that
Congress intended that avenue—§ 3742—to be the exclusive
jurisdictional statute governing sentence appeals.
If § 3742 provides the exclusive avenue for jurisdiction over appeals
of sentencing decisions, it is only logical that Congress impliedly repealed
any previous appellate jurisdiction the courts of appeals had over
criminal sentences under § 1291. And, if that is the case, the only way
jurisdiction can be expanded to include Booker’s review for
reasonableness is by interpreting § 3742. Most courts have done just that,
245
finding appellate jurisdiction over such sentences in § 3742(a)(1). The
logic is that, after Booker, if a sentence is “unreasonable,” it was imposed
“in violation of law.”
I take issue with this position for two reasons. First, the premise that
§ 3742(a)(1) provides jurisdiction over reasonableness review is flawed.
As I explain in the remainder of this Part, the courts of appeals have
incorrectly asserted that a standard of review guiding the appellate
courts—namely, reasonableness—somehow imposes a substantive legal

241. Id. §§ 3562(b)(2)–(3), 3572(c)(2)–(3), 3582(b)(2)–(3).
242. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 (1983).
243. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, § 215, 98 Stat 1987, 2015. In
2002, the Committee deleted the portion of Rule 35(a) implemented as part of the SRA on the ground
that that provision was “no longer needed.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory committee’s note (2002). As
the Committee explained, § 3742 “clearly covers the subject matter” and “it is not necessary to address
an issue that would be very clear to a district court following a decision by a court of appeals.” Id.
244. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 158 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3341.
245. See United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that an unreasonable
sentence is imposed “in violation of law”); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327–28 (3d Cir.
2006) (same); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 25–26 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); United States v.
Martinez, 434 F.3d 1318, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050,
1052–55 (8th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 377 (4th Cir. 2006)
(same); United States v. Plouffe, 445 F.3d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v.
Boscarino, 437 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109,
1113–14 (10th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Frokjer, 415 F.3d 865, 875 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2005)
(same).

Rosenbaum-62-HLJ-865 (Do Not Delete)

March 2011]

4/28/2011 12:26 PM

RIGHTING THE HISTORICAL RECORD

905

requirement on the district courts that, when violated, “violates the law.”
Second, there are significant reasons to doubt the exclusivity principle—
246
that is, that § 3742 provides the exclusive avenue for jurisdiction.
Before getting to the flaws in the exclusivity principle and my
arguments for alternative bases for review of reasonableness appeals, the
majority position on § 3742(a)(1) must be tackled. There are two very
convincing reasons to reject § 3742(a)(1) as a basis for jurisdiction over
reasonableness appeals. Both were articulated for the first time in Judge
247
Aldisert’s well-reasoned dissent in United States v. Cooper. First, as
noted above, the prevailing view, endorsed by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Ruiz, is that Congress intended § 3742(a)(1) to cover
248
only the limited types of sentence appeals available before the SRA.
No court prior to the SRA’s adoption reviewed a sentence based purely
on a claim that the sentence was “unreasonable,” although, as explained
above, courts presumably would have had the jurisdiction to do so. Just
as with appeals of downward departures, “converting ‘any arguable claim
of error in sentencing, including a claim that a particular sentence is
unreasonably high or low,’ . . . into a violation of law for purposes of
249
§ 3742(a)(1)” renders the other sections of § 3742(a) superfluous. As
Judge Aldisert pointed out,
Congress hardly needed to add subsections authorizing appeals that
claim an incorrect application of the Guidelines, that challenge
sentences outside the Guidelines, or that question the reasonableness
of sentences for offenses not governed by the Guidelines, if Subsection
(a)(1) authorizes appeals of all sentences based on any arguable claim
250
of error.

He went on say that his conclusion is supported by an important canon of
statutory construction: “It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction
that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be
prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
251
insignificant.” Reading § 3742(a)(1) to include review for reasonableness
does just that to the remainder of § 3742(a).
Second, even if a court were inclined to broaden the scope of
§ 3742(a)(1) to include previously unasserted claims of error, the
language of the statute itself counsels strongly against including claims

246. As I argue in Part III.B.2, infra, several canons of statutory construction, as well as a review of
Congress’s intent, strongly suggest that Congress could not have meant § 3742 to override appellate
jurisdiction in § 1291, at least as far as it concerns appeals of sentences for reasonableness postBooker.
247. 437 F.3d at 333–41 (Aldisert, J., concurring and dissenting).
248. See 536 U.S. 622, 627 (2002); see also supra text accompanying notes 230–35.
249. Cooper, 437 F.3d at 338–39 (quoting United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1553 (2d Cir.
1989)).
250. Id. at 338 (quoting Colon, 884 F.2d at 1553).
251. Id. at 337 (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)).
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that the sentence is “unreasonable.” It is simply illogical to assert that the
meaning of “in violation of law” can be stretched to include review for
reasonableness. The Booker Court did not create a new substantive law
that could be “violated” when it held that courts of appeals should
review sentences for reasonableness; it merely replaced the standards of
review created by Congress (previously listed in § 3742(e), which the
252
Court excised) with a universal “reasonableness” standard of review.
Indeed, “the Supreme Court has never held that an unreasonable
253
sentence violates the Constitution or any statute.” For these reasons,
Judge Aldisert argued that the courts of appeals did not have jurisdiction
to review within-guidelines sentences, either for reasonableness or under
254
any standard of review.
Although I agree with Judge Aldisert on these points, there is one
additional possibility that he did not consider. Contrary to Judge
Aldisert’s opinion, the Supreme Court did create one new substantive
law in Booker: an expanded ability for sentencing judges to depart from
the Guidelines. Put another way, after Booker, sentencing judges now
have more sentencing choices. However, for the reasons noted above,
this increased discretion cannot justify an expanded definition of “in
255
violation of law” under § 3742(a)(1). Regardless of the particular
characterization of the new kind of sentencing decision—be it a
substantive “reasonableness requirement” or increased sentencing
discretion—expanding the meaning of “in violation of law” to include
review of all sentences for reasonableness still renders several other parts
of § 3742 superfluous. Again, including reasonableness review of all
sentences in § 3742(a)(1) makes other subsections—such as § 3742(a)(4),
which grants jurisdiction over “plainly unreasonable” sentencing
decisions not covered by the Guidelines—redundant and unnecessary.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, to include increased
sentencing discretion as a basis for violating the law under § 3742(a)(1),
thus making all sentences reviewable, directly contradicts the clear
language of the statute and Congress’s obvious intent that § 3742 should
create a “limited” avenue of review. Congress never intended § 3742 to
256
allow for review of within-guidelines sentences on a wholesale basis.
Any responsible interpretation of § 3742(a)(1) must take this into
account.
Judge Aldisert’s position has remained largely unnoticed, both by
the courts and in academia. After Booker, the courts of appeals continue
to take jurisdiction over “reasonableness” appeals of within-guidelines
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 333–36.
Id. at 339 n.17.
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 247–54.
See supra text accompanying notes 225–44.
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257

sentences. Most courts assert jurisdiction over reasonableness review
with little explanation. Some simply cite Booker, saying they must review
sentences for reasonableness because the Supreme Court told them they
258
must. But under the longstanding rule that the Supreme Court cannot
259
manufacture jurisdiction, this position is untenable. Others state, without
260
more, that “an unreasonable sentence is ‘imposed in violation of law.’”
But, as just explained, this position is unsupported by the law.
Indeed, few courts have attempted a more thorough justification of
jurisdiction. Those that have make two major arguments, both reflected
261
in the Eighth Circuit’s decision, United States v. Mickelson. First,
reviewing the legislative history of the SRA and the Booker opinion, the
Mickelson court concluded that appellate review of within-guidelines
sentences is necessary to further Congress’s goal of decreasing
262
sentencing disparity. But, worthy as this goal is, it cannot justify
expanding appellate jurisdiction under § 3742(a)(1). Regardless of
Congress’s intent in enacting the SRA, Congress specifically provided
appellate courts with only limited appellate jurisdiction to review
sentences under § 3742(a)(1). While federal courts are empowered to
interpret statutory provisions, they do not control, and cannot add to,
their own jurisdiction.
Second, the Eighth Circuit in Mickelson suggested that an
unreasonable sentence violates the law because it necessarily results
from a failure to consider the § 3553(a) factors when imposing
263
sentence. But this holding is at odds with the position of all courts of
appeals before Booker, that defendants could not seek review of their
sentences under § 3742(a)(1) “on the ground that the sentence imposed
264
was in violation of the sentencing mandates of section 3553.” Just as in
the context of downward departures, courts before Booker reasonably
pointed out that allowing appeals based on any arguable § 3553 error

257. See authorities cited supra note 245.
258. See, e.g., United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 517 (1st Cir. 2006) (“A majority of
Justices said explicitly in Booker that sentences would be reviewable for reasonableness whether they
fell within or without the guidelines, and for us that is the end of the matter.”).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 21–23.
260. United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 373–75 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Martinez,
434 F.3d 1318, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2006).
261. 433 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2006).
262. Id. at 1053–55.
263. Id.; see supra notes 50 & 231 (discussing § 3553(a) factors); see also Unites States v. Plouffe,
445 F.3d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006) (also suggesting that an unreasonable sentence is “in violation of
law” under § 3742(a)(1) based on a failed application of the § 3553(a)(1) factors); United States v.
Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d
375, 378 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[A] contention that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence is
itself a contention that the court erred under § 3553(a).”).
264. United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that neither § 3553(a) nor
§ 3553(b) justified an exercise of jurisdiction under § 3742).
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would render superfluous the rest of § 3742 and “would be contrary to
265
Congress’ desire to provide for limited appellate review of sentences.”
Perhaps anticipating such a rebuttal, the Mickelson court further noted
that “there are now more sentencing variables” for a sentencing court to
consider after Booker, suggesting that § 3553(a) takes on a different
266
significance after Booker than before. But this point also fails to
support the court’s jurisdictional position. Sentencing courts consider the
exact same factors—namely, the § 3553(a) factors—after Booker as they
267
did before. The only thing that has changed is that the sentencing
judges have more choice at the end of the equation to sentence outside
the guidelines ranges. As explained above, this increased “choice”
cannot by itself justify expanding the definition of § 3742(a)(1).
The Supreme Court has done nothing to provide clarity on the
jurisdictional questions left open by Booker. The Court in Gall recently
reaffirmed its order that all courts of appeals must review all sentences
268
for reasonableness, including within-guidelines sentences. And, despite
the clear opportunity to do so (Judge Aldisert issued his dissent in
Cooper a year before Gall), the Supreme Court declined to articulate a
basis for claiming jurisdiction over this review.
But the fact that the Supreme Court says the courts of appeals must
review certain types of sentences simply cannot be enough to resolve
such a weighty issue. Even with the expanded jurisdiction after Booker,
recent evidence shows that courts of appeals rarely reverse a sentence on
269
reasonableness grounds. But this does not mean expanded jurisdiction
does not have an impact. First, as noted above, the number of sentence
270
appeals rose significantly after Booker. These increases have a major
impact on the workload of the federal court system, which is already
271
struggling with crowded dockets and limited government funds.
In addition, any change in the jurisdiction of the courts has the
potential to impact wider areas of the law than originally anticipated.
This is even more so if, as Judge Aldisert implied in his Cooper dissent,
the Court has indeed illegally, and surreptitiously, expanded the
jurisdiction of the appellate courts sua sponte. Questions of jurisdiction

265. United States v. Franz, 886 F.2d 973, 979 n.7 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Morales, 898 F.2d at 102.
266. United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2006).
267. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259–60 (2005) (“Without the ‘mandatory’
provision, the [SRA] nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together with
other sentencing goals [in § 3553(a)].”).
268. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).
269. See authorities cited supra note 17.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 10–18.
271. See, e.g., Responding to the Growing Need for Federal Judgeships: The Federal Judicial Act of
2009: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 64–65 (2009) (prepared statement of the Am. Bar. Ass’n).
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“go[] to the very foundation of our constitutional scheme.”
Supreme Court has explained,

As the

The statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction
are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers,
restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining
them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects. . . . For a
court to pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state
or federal law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition,
273
for a court to act ultra vires.

Thus, a deeper analysis of the jurisdictional basis for review of
within-guidelines sentences is warranted.
B. Two Possible Bases for Jurisdiction over “Reasonableness
Review”
There are two alternative ways of interpreting § 3742 that justify
review of within-guidelines sentences for reasonableness without
improper judicial expansion of jurisdiction. Under the first, one can read
§ 3742(a)(4) to include review of sentences under the now-advisory
Guidelines as sentences “imposed for an offense for which there is no
274
sentencing guideline.” As I note below, however, this position also has
its flaws. The better reading of § 3742 is that, contrary to the majority
view, § 3742 is not the exclusive avenue for appeals of criminal sentences.
Under this second theory, § 1291 is still a valid basis for jurisdiction in
the sentencing appeals context, and § 3742 merely provides limits on the
types of review that the courts of appeals may reach when deciding issues
uniquely related to the Guidelines system itself (as opposed to the
district courts’ newfound discretion). I discuss each interpretation of
§ 3742 in turn below.
1.

Section 3742(a)(4) as a Basis for Jurisdiction over
Reasonableness Review

Section 3742(a)(4) provides for the appeal of a sentence that is
“imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline and is
275
plainly unreasonable.” Before Booker, and still today, § 3742(a)(4) has
been used to justify only a very limited number of appeals of sentences
that Congress did not include in the guidelines calculus. For example,
sentences for state crimes assimilated into federal law by the Assimilative
276
Crimes Act, such as state crimes committed on military bases, are not

272. United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 315, 1333 (10th Cir. 2004) (Murphy, J. dissenting) (citing
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998)).
273. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101–02 (1998) (internal citations omitted).
274. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4) (2006).
275. Id.
276. Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 13, 62 Stat. 645 (1948) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006))
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included in the sentencing guidelines. These sentences are reviewable
278
under § 3742(a)(4).
But § 3742(a)(4) may also be a vehicle for reviewing sentences for
reasonableness that are imposed under the now-advisory Guidelines.
Congress could not have anticipated that the Supreme Court would
eviscerate the mandatory nature of the Guidelines as it did in Booker.
But Congress did anticipate that there may be some offenses that are
simply not covered by those Guidelines. To make sure that such offenses,
and their resulting sentences, would not be left out of the review process,
Congress included § 3742(a)(4) and (b)(4). In its 1984 report, the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary provided examples of the types of offenses
for which there is no sentencing guideline. These “would include the
situations where there is a new law for which no guideline has yet been
developed and where an appellate court has invalidated the established
279
The
guideline and no replacement had yet been determined.”
Committee further explained that “[a] sentence not subject to a guideline
280
is . . . open to broad appeal by both sides.”
It is reasonable to conclude that sentences imposed under the
advisory system created in Booker should be included in this catchall
provision as an additional type of unanticipated sentence. Congress
designed the Guidelines “to promote fairness and rationality, and to
281
reduce unwarranted disparity, in sentencing.” Given this purpose,
“[s]entences within the Guidelines may be deemed to be reasonable and
within the exclusive discretion of the sentencing court solely because of
282
the Commission’s blessing of the permissible range.” But when the
Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory, the Court, in essence,
made all sentences non-Guidelines sentences. Indeed, in light of the
Court’s decision to expand the discretion of the sentencing judges,
Congress’s aim of uniformity in sentencing would be achieved by making
the purely discretionary portion of the sentencing decision—which did
not exist under the mandatory Guidelines—reviewable.
However, no court or scholar has adopted such a reading of
283
§ 3742(a)(4). One possible explanation is that § 3742(a)(4) covers

277. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 531 F.3d 288, 291–93 (4th Cir. 2008) (applying § 3742(a)(4)
to appeal of assimilated sentence of a DUI on a military base); see also United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 262 (2005) (describing supervised release revocation sentences as sentences “imposed
where there was no applicable Guideline”).
278. Booker, 543 U.S. at 262.
279. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 153 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3336.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 150; see also United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1555 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The very
nature of the sentencing reform enterprise was to establish national standards narrowing the discretion
of sentencing judges so as to attain a degree of uniformity.”).
282. Colon, 884 F.2d at 1555.
283. Cf. United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1055 n.2 (8th Cir. 2006) (suggesting, but not
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unanticipated “offenses,” not unanticipated “sentences.” Under that
subsection, courts of appeals may hear appeals of sentences “imposed for
284
an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline.” But, under the
now-advisory Guidelines scheme, most offenses are still covered by the
Guidelines, even if the resulting purely discretionary sentences are not.
Judges are still required to apply those Guidelines in determining an
“advisory sentence,” even if they now have the discretion to impose a
different sentence. Another possible explanation is the fact that
§ 3742(a)(4) and (b)(4) grant jurisdiction over appeals of sentences that
are “plainly unreasonable.” Although the difference between these two
standards, if any, is a point of contention among the circuits, it is at least
clear that it would be redundant to review a “plainly unreasonable”
285
sentence for “reasonableness.”
But, assuming that courts want to justify reasonableness review
under § 3742 (a position that I in no way suggest is either legal or
advisable), inclusion of reasonableness review under the “unanticipated
offense” subsection, § 3742(a)(4), rather than the “in violation of law”
subsection, § 3742(a)(1), is a more rational interpretation of the statute.
By enacting § 3742(a)(4), Congress already suggested its intent to make
reasonableness a substantive requirement for those sentences that it
could not anticipate in advance. Accordingly, it is rational to include
reasonableness review of the unexpectedly advisory Guidelines sentences
under that same provision. At least it appears to be less of a stretch than
creating a substantive requirement for reasonableness that did not
previously exist in order to justify review of sentences for legal error
under § 3742(a)(1). Furthermore, this interpretation would also be
consistent with the prevailing view that § 3742 provides the exclusive
avenue for appellate review of sentences, a view that finds some support
in the statutory text and legislative history, as noted above.
2.

Section 1291 as a Basis for Jurisdiction over Reasonableness
Review

That being said, for each of the above analyses—that is, finding
jurisdiction to review within-guidelines sentence for reasonableness
under either § 3742(a)(1) or (a)(4)—there is a bit of a bitter taste left in
the mouth. Under both, the courts are required to adopt an
interpretation of those sections that is contrary to past precedent, the
plain language of the statute, and Congress’s specific and clearly

deciding, that § 3742(a)(4) could possibly provide a basis for jurisdiction over reasonableness review
because, “after Booker there is no longer a binding sentencing guideline for any offense”).
284. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4) (2006) (emphasis added).
285. See United States v. Miller, No. 09-11063, 2011 WL 692988, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2011)
(discussing a split among the circuit courts regarding whether to apply Booker’s reasonableness
standard to appellate review of supervised release under § 3742(a)(4)).
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expressed intent.
But there is an alternative interpretation of § 3742 that would not
require a sua sponte change in substantive criminal law: that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 is still, and has been, a valid basis for jurisdiction in the sentencing
286
appeals context.
The Eleventh Circuit first articulated a version of this theory in
287
United States v. Fossett. In that case, the court had to decide whether
courts of appeals had the statutory jurisdiction to hear an appeal by a
defendant who argued that a district court erred in refusing a downward
288
departure. As noted above, all courts that had already decided the
issue found that § 3742 defined the exclusive jurisdictional basis for
sentencing appeals, and that the statute prohibited appeals by sentences
289
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. In a
of downward departures.
surprising change from the predominant view, the Fossett court held that
§ 3742 never caused the repeal of § 1291; § 1291 remained in force and
290
continued to provide for jurisdiction over sentencing appeals. Section
3742, the court held, “does not regulate the jurisdiction of the courts of
appeals over appeals themselves; rather, section 3742 defines the claims
291
that the court of appeals may hear in reviewing an appeal.” In essence,
the court saw § 1291 as defining the scope of jurisdiction, while § 3742
merely limited the scope of review.
Nevertheless, the result of the Eleventh Circuit’s novel
interpretation of § 1291 was the same as that of the other courts of
appeals on this issue. Although the Eleventh Circuit recognized its
statutory jurisdiction to hear appeals of downward departures, it agreed
with the other courts of appeals that § 3742 prevented defendants from
292
challenging the refusal to depart on appeal.
Perhaps because the Eleventh Circuit’s Fossett decision had the
same result of foreclosing appeals of refusals to depart downward, that
decision received little notice. In fact, it was barely mentioned again until
2004, when the Tenth Circuit cited the Fossett court’s jurisdictional
analysis as support for its holding in United States v. Hahn that appellate
courts have jurisdiction under § 1291 to hear appeals of legally
293
enforceable waivers. In Hahn, the defendant entered into a plea
agreement on sexual exploitation charges, specifically waiving the right
294
to appeal his sentence under § 3742. The district court subsequently
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
881 F.2d 976 (11th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 978–79.
See supra text accompanying notes 232–35.
881 F.2d at 978–79.
Id. at 979.
Id. at 979–80.
359 F.3d 1315, 1321 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004).
See id. at 1317.
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sentenced him a term of twenty-four years’ imprisonment to be served
consecutively with a previous sentence of forty years’ imprisonment for
295
weapons and marijuana charges. The district court ordered that the
sentences run consecutively only after finding that the court lacked the
296
discretion to issue concurrent sentences. The defendant appealed his
sentence, arguing the sentence was unlawful because the district court
incorrectly assumed it did not have the discretion to order concurrent
297
sentences. The government opposed on the grounds that (1) the
defendant waived the right to appeal under § 3742; and, (2) the court of
appeals did not have jurisdiction because the waiver itself was not “in
violation of the law” under § 3742(a)(1) and no other § 3742(a) factor
298
applied.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed. Even if the defendant waived his right
to appeal under § 3742, the court held that it could still assert jurisdiction
299
over the appeal of the sentence as a “final order” under § 1291. The
court found two bases for support of its decision. First, as the court
explained, repeals by implication are disfavored, and Congress did not
“clearly” express its intent to repeal “the pre-1984 scope of § 1291”
300
through the enactment of § 3742. Second, the court pointed out that the
scope of § 1291 jurisdiction prior to the passage of the SRA included “an
abuse of discretion review” over sentencing errors, including errors such
301
as that asserted by Hahn.
The precise scope of the Hahn decision is unclear. Presumably, the
court’s opinion can be taken as an endorsement of the view that § 1291
provides jurisdiction over all sentence appeals, regardless of the language
of § 3742. If Congress did not repeal the pre-1984 scope of jurisdiction
under § 1291 through the enactment of § 3742, and if § 1291 includes no
jurisdictional limitation on sentence appeals, presumably § 3742 provides
no jurisdictional bar to the review of sentences today.
However, we know this is not the Tenth Circuit’s position. To this
day, the Tenth Circuit follows the majority position and refuses to hear
appeals of requests to depart downward because courts of appeals “have
302
no jurisdiction to review a refusal to depart” under § 3742. The Tenth

295. Id. at 1317–18.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1318.
298. Id. at 1320.
299. Id. at 1320–22.
300. Id. (citing Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003)).
301. Id. at 1321 & n.5 (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96–100 (1996)).
302. See United States v. Coddington, 118 F.3d 1439, 1441 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States
v. Belt, 89 F.3d 710, 714 (10th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Chavez-Diaz, 444 F.3d 1223, 1229
(10th Cir. 2006) (holding that, after Booker, although the court still did not have jurisdiction to review
the district court’s discretionary decision to deny a downward departure, it would review the ultimate
sentence for reasonableness).
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Circuit has not yet explained the discord between this position and its
position on the viability of § 1291 jurisdiction over sentence appeals in
Hahn. Nevertheless, several aspects of the Hahn court’s analysis are
helpful in determining the current scope of § 1291 in sentencing appeals.
In analyzing whether § 1291 still provides a valid means of
jurisdiction over sentencing appeals, the Hahn court first observed that,
if § 3742 is interpreted as the exclusive means of appellate jurisdiction
over sentencing appeals, then § 3742 must act as an implied repeal of
303
Before the SRA, § 1291 unquestionably provided the
§ 1291.
jurisdictional hook for sentencing appeals. Now, under the majority
position, it does not; only an implied repeal of § 1291 would accomplish
this. The court then listed several canons of statutory construction to
help it determine whether Congress did, in fact, impliedly repeal § 1291.
First, the court acknowledged that, ordinarily, “where a specific
304
provision conflicts with a general one, the specific governs.” Here, the
more specific statute, § 3742, appears to conflict with the more general
statute, § 1291, in that § 3742 excludes specific types of sentences from
appellate review. Even the Hahn court acknowledged that “[s]trictly
adhering to this canon [of statutory construction] would require courts to
305
accept sentencing appeals exclusively under § 3742(a).”
The Hahn court dismissed this conclusion, though, stating that
another canon of statutory construction is “more applicable to this
306
case.” According to this second canon, “clearly expressed congressional
intention” is required before a court will hold that a statute is repealed
307
by implication. Furthermore, as the Hahn court pointed out, “An
implied repeal will only be found where provisions in two statutes are in
irreconcilable conflict, or where the latter Act covers the whole subject
308
of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute.”
With these principles in mind, the Hahn court held that Congress
did not “clearly express[]” its intent to repeal § 1291, and thus, that
309
statute still provides jurisdiction over appeals of criminal sentences. As
310
the Hahn court points out, § 3742(a) “does not explicitly limit” § 1291.
In fact, § 1291 is never mentioned—neither in the statute itself nor in the
311
legislative history surrounding the enactment of § 3742. Moreover,
§ 3742 does not “cover the field” of § 1291: § 3742 covers far less than

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1321–22.
Id. at 1321 (citing Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 657 (1997)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003)).
Id. (quoting Branch, 538 U.S. at 273).
Id. at 1321–22.
Id. at 1321 n.6.
See id. at 1322 (“The legislative history of § 3742 does not discuss its impact on § 1291.”).
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§ 1291, which includes jurisdiction over both civil and criminal appeals.
And finally, the Hahn court noted that Congress repeatedly expressed its
313
“intent to expand appellate review over sentencing,” not to limit it. For
these reasons, the court held that Congress did not impliedly repeal
§ 1291, and that statute provides the basis for appellate jurisdiction over
314
sentencing appeals.
The analysis in Hahn is compelling. At the very least, one would
have imagined that if Congress did intend to repeal a bedrock statute
that had provided jurisdiction over sentence appeals for almost a
century, it would have mentioned that intent, or that statute, somewhere.
But Congress did not. In enacting the SRA and related provisions,
Congress directed its entire focus on creating its Guidelines scheme.
Nevertheless, the Hahn court’s conclusion—that § 1291 still exists in
full force after the enactment of the SRA—has at least one fundamental
flaw: There can be no doubt that Congress intended to foreclose review
of at least some specific sentencing decisions by enacting § 3742. For
example, Congress did not provide for review of (1) appeals by
defendants of failures to sentence below the Guidelines, and (2) appeals
315
by the government of failures to sentence above the Guidelines. The
fact that Congress left these kinds of appeals out of § 3742
unquestionably manifests Congress’s intent to foreclose review of these
decisions. Such a conclusion is in line with Congress’s intent in enacting
the SRA: Since Congress’s overriding goal was to promote consistent
sentencing, decisions by sentencing judges not to depart from those
guidelines ranges were of little concern. These are exactly the types of
sentencing appeals that Congress feared would be “frivolous” and would
316
clog the courts. Furthermore, Congress specifically stated that the
Guidelines were drafted so as to “preserve the concept that the
discretion of a sentencing judge has a proper place in sentencing and
317
should not be displaced by the discretion of an appellate court.” It
cannot be questioned, then, that Congress intended to impose some
limits on the scope of review over sentencing decisions under the
Guidelines.
This intent to foreclose review of specific sentencing decisions
makes § 1291 and § 3742 in “irreconcilable conflict,” suggesting, under
the implied repeal rule referred to in Hahn, that Congress impliedly

312.
313.
36)).
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id.
Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 150–53 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3333–
Id.
See supra note 229.
See supra text accompanying notes 237–39.
S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 150 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3333.
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repealed § 1291, at least in part, through the enactment of § 3742.
Furthermore, under a rule of statutory construction not mentioned in
Hahn, congressional intent may be revealed though the maxim, expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, or “expressing one item of an associated group
319
or series excludes another left unmentioned.” Applying this “rule of
exclusion” to § 3742, there can be no doubt that Congress intended to
foreclose review of specific types of sentences when it listed the available
sentencing appeals in § 3742(a)(1)–(4).
On the other hand, there is no such clear expression of Congress’s
intent to foreclose review of sentences under the now-advisory
Guidelines. Indeed, as the majority in the Third Circuit’s Cooper
decision points out, “in enacting §§ 3742(a)(1) and (b)(1), Congress
could not have contemplated that the sentencing scheme it adopted
320
would later be declared advisory.” The Supreme Court in Booker
created an entirely new kind of sentencing decision, a sentence
pronounced under the advisory Guidelines. This advisory-Guidelines
sentence simply did not exist at the time Congress enacted the SRA.
Congress could not have “intended” to exclude review of a sentencing
321
decision it did not contemplate. Accordingly, it would stretch reason to
say that § 1291 and § 3742 are “in irreconcilable conflict” over whether
appellate courts have jurisdiction over appeals of sentences under the
advisory Guidelines scheme created in Booker.
Nor can it be said that Congress intended § 3742 to so “cover the
field” of sentencing appeals that § 3742 “is clearly intended as a
322
substitute” for § 1291. Again, as the Hahn court explained, § 1291 is
323
never mentioned, either in the statute or in the legislative history.
Furthermore, § 3742 was never meant as a statute to govern appeals of
discretionary sentences under an advisory guidelines scheme. Although
the Senate Judiciary Committee did refer to § 3742 as including a
324
“comprehensive system of review of sentences,” this statement must be
understood in the context of the mandatory Guidelines system Congress
was creating at the time. Congress may have targeted § 3742 to cover all
types of sentencing decisions that could arise under a mandatory
sentencing scheme, but it did not, and could not, take into account
sentencing decisions made entirely at the discretion of the district court.
No such thing existed under the system then in force. Furthermore, in the

318. See supra text accompanying note 308.
319. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002) (quoting United States v. Vonn,
535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)).
320. United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 2006).
321. Id.
322. United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1322 (10th Cir. 2004).
323. See id. (“The legislative history of § 3742 does not discuss its impact on § 1291.”).
324. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 155 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3338.
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five years since the Booker decision, Congress has been silent on the
issue of reasonableness review, despite the massive increase in sentence
appeals. This suggests Congress’s intention to allow reasonableness
review, despite the jurisdictional limitations set forth in § 3742.
In light of this, it cannot be said that there is clear and convincing
evidence of congressional intent to repeal § 1291, at least as far as that
statute governs appeals of the ultimate, purely discretionary portion of
the sentencing decision existing today. In at least that instance, §§ 1291
and 3742 are merely two statutes touching on the same subject, not
statutes “in conflict.” In United States v. Barnes, an early statutory
interpretation case, the Supreme Court provided guidance on how courts
should interpret two statutes covering the same topic:
The . . . natural, if not . . . necessary inference in all such cases is, that
the legislature intends the new laws to be auxiliary to, and in aid of the
purposes of the old law, even when some of the cases provided for may
equally be within the reach of each. There certainly, under such
circumstances, ought to be a manifest and total repugnancy in the
provisions, to lead to the conclusion that the latter laws abrogated, and
325
were designed to abrogate the former.

In light of the legislative history, § 3742 and § 1291 can be easily read
326
together to determine Congress’s overall intent. First, we know from
the legislative history and from § 3742 itself that Congress intended to
327
expand review of sentences beyond that available prior to the SRA.
We also know, however, that Congress did not intend for that review to
328
be unlimited. It is at least clear that Congress intended to foreclose
review of some, but not all, sentencing decisions by failing to include
them in § 3742. There is a “manifest and total repugnancy in the
provisions” at least to the extent that § 1291 grants jurisdiction generally,
and § 3742 restricts access to specific types of sentencing decisions made
under the Sentencing Guidelines.

325. United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 520 (1912) (emphasis added) (quoting Wood v. United
States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342, 363 (1842)).
326. To state that I am attempting to determine Congress’s “intent” here is admittedly a bit
confusing. Congress intended nothing with regard to review of sentences for reasonableness when it
enacted § 3742—in fact, it did not think about this kind of review at all. One would not be
unreasonable to point out that the canons of statutory construction mentioned above are designed to
help understand congressional intent, id. at 519, and cannot miraculously divine what Congress “would
have wanted” in some make-believe version of events. Hence Justice Scalia’s criticism in his dissent in
Booker that “[o]nly in Wonderland” can the Court imply a standard of review from a statute when it
had just severed the standard of review Congress explicitly provided. United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 309 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, in enacting § 1291, Congress did intend to create a
broad review of final decisions of the district courts. The question for this discussion is whether § 3742,
which naturally says nothing about appellate review of sentences under a then-nonexistent advisory
Guidelines scheme, can be said to trump the older, broader, grant of jurisdiction in § 1291. The canons
of statutory interpretation are specifically designed to help us answer this kind of question.
327. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1322.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 232–44.
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The logical conclusion from this is that § 3742 works in tandem with
§ 1291, limiting judicial review of only those sentencing decisions that are
part of Congress’s sentencing Guidelines scheme but leaving intact the
general grant of jurisdiction over sentence appeals under § 1291. So, for
example, an appellate court cannot review the specific decision by a
district court not to depart from the guidelines range—§ 3742 blocks that
329
review. But, appellate courts retain the power under § 1291 to review
the ultimate, purely discretionary portion of the sentencing decision for
reasonableness, as required by Booker.
This conclusion is not only the logical reading of both § 3742 and
§ 1291, but it also resolves an area of tension in the post-Booker case law.
As I have already noted, all courts of appeals today take jurisdiction over
review of sentences for reasonableness under § 3742(a)(1), claiming that
330
an unreasonable sentence violates the law. However, these same courts
have also held, post-Booker, that they will continue to dismiss appeals of
331
refusals to depart downward on jurisdictional grounds. This rule, as
noted above, was based on the “conclusion that 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and
(b) reflect Congress’s intent to foreclose review of a sentencing court’s
332
decision not to depart.” Thus, on one hand, the appellate courts tell us
that they cannot review discretionary decisions not to depart because
§ 3742 precludes review of within-guidelines sentences, but they will
review within-guidelines sentences for reasonableness under § 3742
because the Supreme Court said they could. These positions are directly
contradictory and undermine the integrity of the courts and the rule of
333
law.
The position I advocate here would resolve this tension. Under my
thesis, refusals to depart downwards, which are at the heart of Congress’s
334
sentencing Guidelines scheme, could not be reviewed under § 3742.
But the overall sentence could still be reviewed for reasonableness under
§ 1291. This conclusion has the same result—that is, allowing jurisdiction
to review for reasonableness but barring review of specific sentencing
decisions as intended by Congress—and yet avoids the contradictory
reading of the same statute plaguing the courts of appeals today.

329. See supra text accompanying notes 232–34.
330. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327–28 (3d Cir. 2006).
331. See, e.g., id. at 332–33.
332. Id. at 333.
333. There is a similar tension between the position that the courts of appeals can review sentences
for reasonableness under § 3742, and the position that the courts do not have jurisdiction to review a
denial of a Rule 35(b) sentence reduction because § 3742 precludes it. See United States v. Bowers,
615 F.3d 715, 725–28 (6th Cir. 2010) (discussing contradictory positions of the courts on jurisdiction
over sentencing decisions, but nevertheless holding that denials of Rule 35(b) sentence reduction
motions are unreviewable). Again, my reading of § 3742 and § 1291 would resolve this tension.
334. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2006) (permitting a deviation from the Guidelines only in certain
limited circumstances).
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I acknowledge that my reading of § 1291 as providing for
jurisdiction over reasonableness review may feel somewhat contrived,
just as the justification of jurisdiction under § 3742(a)(1) does. This is
probably because the result under both interpretations is to allow for
more appeals of sentences than originally intended by Congress when it
enacted the SRA. Yet such is the inevitable result from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Booker to reinvent the Guidelines; any interpretation
of jurisdiction under the SRA after Booker will inevitably include a
determination of what Congress would have wanted in a world that
Congress never anticipated. There is a key difference between the
majority position and mine, though: I do not attempt to stretch the SRA
beyond its clear boundaries. Instead, I interpret a historical and bedrock
jurisdictional statute of general application to include review of district
court decisions that are not part of the SRA scheme Congress enacted.
Furthermore, my interpretation of § 1291 and § 3742 avoids incorrect and
contradictory interpretations of § 3742 and still comports with the intent
of Congress to provide for limited review of specific sentencing decisions
mandated by the Guidelines.
After complaining at length above about the confusion the courts
have caused by failing to distinguish between “jurisdiction” and
“standard of review,” I would be remiss in making the same mistake
here. It is difficult to tell definitively whether, in enacting § 3742,
Congress thought it was describing jurisdiction, thereby implicating
§ 1291, or describing the scope of review, presumably leaving § 1291
335
untouched. On the one hand, it is a “well established principle that a
court will not construe a statute to restrict access to judicial review unless
Congress manifests its intent to do so by ‘clear and convincing
336
evidence.’” On the other, as I explained in Part III.A., there are several
strong indications that Congress meant § 3742 to define the exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, at least in the mandatory Guidelines
337
sentencing context. These include, among others, the use of exclusive
language in the statute, the attempt to make a comprehensive system of
335. If the courts could not consistently articulate the reason for the rule of nonreview, it is not
surprising that Congress couldn’t clarify exactly what it intended to expand by listing out various
avenues of appeal in § 3742. In its Senate Report accompanying the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1983, the Committee on the Judiciary describes appellate review of sentences pre-SRA as
“unavailab[le]” with few exceptions due to the fact that “sentencing judges have traditionally had
almost absolute discretion to impose any sentence legally available in a particular case.” S. Rep. No.
98-225, at 150 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3333 (citing United States v. Dorszynski,
418 U.S. 424 (1974)). While this may accurately describe the practical effect of the rule of nonreview, it
does not sufficiently describe the basis for that rule (policy or jurisdictional).
336. S. Windsor Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 541 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975)) (holding that the Court of Claims has exclusive
jurisdiction over challenges by providers to reimbursement determinations made under the Medicare
Act).
337. See supra notes 232–44 and accompanying text.

Rosenbaum-62-HLJ-865 (Do Not Delete)

920

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

4/28/2011 12:26 PM

[Vol. 62:865

criminal appeals through amendment of various criminal procedure
statutes, and the various indications in the legislative history that review
338
would be confined to the types of sentences listed in § 3742. The Fossett
position—that is, that § 3742 merely describes the scope of review on
339
appeals of sentencing decisions —ignores this compelling evidence.
Accordingly, it is much more likely that Congress intended § 3742 to
describe the jurisdiction of the federal courts of appeals in the mandatory
Guidelines context.

Conclusion
Through the above analysis, I have established several key points.
First, despite the conventional wisdom, courts of appeals have had the
jurisdiction to review criminal sentences under § 1291 since at least 1891.
This jurisdiction was almost unlimited, the only possible exception being
the ability to modify sentences on appeal. Although courts routinely
rejected appeals of the length of sentences for “lack of power” or “lack
of jurisdiction,” they did so erroneously, due to a kind of common law
inertia, relying on sound bites from older decisions without fully
analyzing the basis for those decisions. In fact, this “rule of nonreview”
was based not on jurisdiction but on a policy of deference to the
sentencing judge—a policy that can be changed at any point, by either
Congress or the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did just that in
Booker. By mandating review of sentencing decisions for reasonableness,
the Supreme Court may have expanded the scope of review of
sentencing decisions, and thus the number of appeals that courts of
appeals would have to hear, but it did not improperly expand the
jurisdiction of those courts—it was there all along.
The Court’s expansion of appellate review in Booker was also
consistent with the scope of appellate jurisdiction available after the
SRA. It is beyond doubt that Congress intended, through the enactment
of the SRA and the Guidelines, to provide an expanded, but at the same
time finite, review of criminal sentences on appeal. It did so by listing in
§ 3742 the types of sentences that the courts of appeals could review and
by making § 3742 the exclusive avenue for appeal of sentences under the
Guidelines, presumably to the exclusion of other appellate jurisdiction
statutes like § 1291. However, the Supreme Court in Booker created an
entirely new type of sentencing decision, a purely discretionary decision
that lies outside Congress’s Guidelines system and, thus, outside the
limits of § 3742. Accordingly, at least for these types of sentences, § 1291
remains the basis for jurisdiction over reasonableness appeals.
One might ask: Why didn’t the Supreme Court, or the appellate
338. See supra notes 232–44 and accompanying text.
339. United States v. Fossett, 881 F.2d 976, 979 (11th Cir. 1989).
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courts for that matter, just say so? We cannot overlook the fact that,
despite several opportunities to do so after Booker, the Supreme Court
has not even attempted to explain the jurisdictional basis for the
reasonableness review it created. Given the failure to address the
jurisdictional basis for reasonableness review, one could presume that
the Supreme Court did not actually examine either § 1291 or § 3742
when deciding Booker. Because jurisdiction is fundamental to a court’s
power to adjudicate, one must assume that the Court would not want to
be viewed as dismissive of such bedrock principles of law.
For this reason alone, the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court
should take the earliest opportunity to clarify the jurisdictional basis for
the multitude of reasonableness appeals now brought in federal courts.
Perhaps more importantly, clarification of the basis for appellate
jurisdiction will avoid the conclusion that the Supreme Court improperly
expanded the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, usurping Congress’s
power to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
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